DREAM AND REALITY. 



97 



times be produced by a present impression suffered by one of our 

 senses, half awakened — a contact, the way we are lying, and the con- 

 dition of the organic functions being thus the causes or occasions of 

 dreams. The incoherence of dreams seems no more mysterious in 

 these theories, and is explained as the result of two causes — the slum- 

 ber of the " reflecting " faculties, judgment, reason, the will, the 

 exercise of choice and control; and, secondly, the unrestricted reign 

 of imagination and the association of ideas. Our faith in the reality 

 of the things dreamed is accounted for by the mechanical play of 

 the images, the law being set up that every image that is not opposed 

 by stronger images appears to us a real object. The problem, there- 

 fore, resolves itself: the senses being asleep, the images that arise 

 within us are not contradicted by normal sensations, and that is why 

 we take them for realities. Further, our reflective faculties, being 

 likewise dormant, can not contradict the images, in the absence of 

 sensations, reasonings, or recollections. Hence a credence, as abso- 

 lute as unreasonable. We purpose to show that there is something 

 artificial and prejudiced in the classical theory of opposition between 

 dreams and waking, which assigns illusion, confusion, and incoher- 

 ence to the former, and solid and permanent reality to the latter, and 

 that the difference between them is not so clean cut. 



Most persons in talking of this subject say that they are sure of 

 the reality of things when awake because their different senses con- 

 cur in attesting it. They see a tree, and satisfy themselves that it is 

 a tree by going up and touching it. They smell a rose, and go find 

 the rose, look at it and handle it; while in dreams we are not able 

 to apply these supplementary tests. The distinction is imaginary, 

 for our senses likewise seem to support one another in dreams. We 

 dream not only that we see an object, but also that we feel and hear 

 it. When I dream of meeting a friend, I believe that I see him 

 and shake hands with him and hear him speak. There is, therefore, 

 a complete identity of the two conditions as to this point, and the 

 thing that appears to me in a dream is a " bundle of sensations," 

 visual, tactile, auditive, muscular, and often olfactory, just as it 

 appears to me when awake. 



We are told of another difference. When awake, we find others 

 agreeing with us in recognizing the reality of things. I see a tree, 

 and so do those with me; I show it to them, and they look at it; I 

 feel of it, and they touch it ; I hear the rustling of the leaves, and so 

 do they. Our perceptions in practical life are thus tested by com- 

 parison with those of others, whereas in our dreams we have our 

 solitary and fanciful visions all within ourselves, with none to par- 

 ticipate in our perceptions of them. 



This supposed contrast is no more real than the former one. 



VOL. L1V. — 8 



