GUESSING AND NUMBER PREFERENCES. 785 



bination possible in the tens thus represented. That is to say, other 

 things equal, one would have a right to expect 334 or 332 to occur 

 as often as 333. But the fact is, in this particular case, 333 occurred 

 forty-eight times, while the other two put together occurred only 

 three times. Here, however, we have the combined influence of the 

 preference for the odd over the even and the digital sequence. Still, 

 if we select 444, we find that this number, made up though it is of three 

 digits in general least selected of all, the preference for alliterative 

 effect is strong enough to make the number occur 28 times to 14 

 times for both 443 and 445. If we take 777, we find that it was used 

 more times than all the other combinations from 770 to 779 inclusive, 

 put together. 



Therefore, under conditions similar to those presented for these 

 guesses, one would be safe to expect these duplicative or alliterative 

 numbers to occur much oftener than any other single number in the 

 series. 



It would evidently be unsafe to generalize upon the basis of this 

 study, notwithstanding the large number of guesses considered. 

 However, it seems to me that the results here obtained at least sug- 

 gest a field of inquiry which promises interesting returns. If it be 

 true, as here suggested, that odd numbers are preferred by guessers, 

 advantage could be taken of this preference in many ways. Further- 

 more, as I suspect, it may be that this probable preference points to 

 a habit of mind which more or less influences results not depending 

 strictly on guessing. It has been shown, for example, that the length 

 of criminal sentences has been largely affected by preferences for 5 

 or multijries of 5 — that is to say, where judges have power to fix the 

 length of sentence within certain limits, there is a strong probability 

 that they will be influenced in their judgments by the habitual use 

 of 5 or its multiples. Here it would seem that unconscious prefer- 

 ence overrides what one has a right to consider the most careful and 

 impartial judgments possible, based upon actual and well-digested 

 data.* 



Another thing is noticeable in these guesses. The consciousness 

 of number beyond 1,000 falls off very rapidly. The difference in 

 the values of 1,000 and 1,500 seems to have had less weight with the 

 guessers than a difference of 50 had at any place below 1,000. And 

 so, in a way, 1,000 seems to mark the limit of any sort of definite 

 mental measurement. This fact is more and more emphasized as the 

 numbers representing the guesses increase until one can see there 

 exists absolutely no conception of the value of numbers. For ex- 

 ample, many guessed 1,000,000, while several guessed more than 



* See H. Le Poer. Influence of Number in Criminal Sentences. Harper's Weekly, 

 May 14, 1896. 



VOL. LIY. 59 



