f),S'.> Mast, Loeb's Mechanistic Conception of Life. 



chemical principles, and he maintains that since these problems are 

 among the most fundamental all others can be analysed in the 

 same way. He says (p. 23) "It is not possible to prove in a short 

 address that all life phenomena will yield to a physico-chemical 

 analysis. We have selected only the phenomena of fertilization 

 and heredity, since these phenomena are specific for living organisms 

 and without analogues in inanimate nature; and if we can con- 

 vince ourselves that these processes can be explained physico- 

 chemically we may safely expect the same of such processess for 

 which there exist a-priori analogies in inanimate nature, as, e. g., 

 for absorption and secretion." 



It is evident that everything in this conclusion depends upon 

 the meaning of mechanical and physico-chemical. It will therefore 

 be necessary, first of all, to attempt to ascertain clearly the sense 

 in which L o e b has used these terms. He does not specifically 

 define them, strange as it may seem, especially in a book whose 

 w T hole argument is rooted in them. We can therefore only infer 

 the ideas he intends to convey by their use. His aim in all of 

 his work is to obtain methods for controlling vital phenomena. He 

 says (p. 195): "It was perhaps not the least important of Darwin's 

 services to science that the boldness of his conceptions gave to the 

 experimental biologist courage to enter upon the attempt of con- 

 trolling at will the life phenomena of animals." and (p. li'6) "All 

 the writer could hope to do was to bring together a few instances 

 of the experimental analysis of the effect of environment, which 

 indicate the nature and extent of our control over life phenomena". 

 I assume that he holds that if such phenomena can be controlled, 

 we have a physico-chemical explanation and that such an explana- 

 tion is the foundation of a mechanical conception of life. Mechan- 

 ical and physico-chemical are evidently used synonymously. In fact 

 according to Loeb there is but one kind of explanation; to explain 

 means the same thing as explaining mechanically. He says (p. 58): 

 "All 'explanation' consists solely in the presentation of a phenom- 

 enon as an unequivocal function of the variables by which it is 

 determined." As for metaphysics, our author repeats again and 

 again, it is a "mere play on words", (p. 73) Metaphysicians "employ 

 the wrong methods of investigation and substitute a play on words 

 for an explanation by means of facts", and (p. 3) "In certain of 

 the mental sciences . . . everything rests on argument or rhetoric 

 and . . . what is regarded as true today may be expected with some 

 probability to be considered untrue tomorrow". 



This definition, like a number of other statements in our volume, 

 appears to me to be exceedingly vague. Superficially it looks 

 clear enough, but as soon as one attempts to apply it to actual 

 cases it assumes a different aspect. It seems to mean nothing more 



