3 iO THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



view of the struggle for life ? Can one imagine, in the recesses of an 

 organ, a single cell, a single element, which is not fighting for exist- 

 ence ? If there could be one, then there would exist in reality some- 

 thing else than forces encountering forces, and that is a consequence 

 which Hartmann himself could not admit, recognizing, as he does, 

 nothing but forces in the atoms of matter, and explaining, as he does, 

 reality and consciousness by the opposition of contending forces. We 

 shall find him, farther on, maintaining that, when two contrary but 

 equal forces meet, they annul and annihilate each other, and all reality 

 vanishes ; and yet the same author, arguing against Darwin, supposes 

 a reality which is not the result of the encounter and strife of forces. 

 For Hartmann, more than any other reasoner, the sphere of selection 

 onght to be coextensive with that of reality, and whenever conflict 

 and selection cease, by reason of the equilibrium of forces, there should 

 be nothing but annihilation. But contradiction, we all know, is the 

 hereditary vice of metaphysics. 



In proof that certain facts have no concern with the struggle for 

 life, Hartmann mentions beauty, and especially the beauty of plauts, 

 which it would be difficult to explain by selection. Here we find our- 

 selves face to face with German aesthetics, with its mystical theories, 

 and its metaphysical entities. For ourselves, regarding beauty not as 

 a real fact, but simply as a relation between things and our faculties, 

 we do not feel this difficulty. We admit that selection has nothing to 

 do with the matter, because beauty is neither an act, nor an organ, 

 nor a function : it is simply a mode in us of feeling outward objects ; 

 it is a sentiment inspired by things which answer to our habits of 

 thought, and correspond with our associations of ideae. There is not, in 

 Nature, any fact which is beautiful only ; whatever is beautiful is at the 

 same time an object, and the forces that produce it, produce it, so far as 

 it is an object, and not so far as it is beautiful. We are not speaking of 

 art, in which selection again comes up ; and, in fact, if there is no nat- 

 ural selection as to beauty, there may be, in very many cases, artificial 

 or intelligent selection : among animals, and especially as regards 

 man, we know that beauty exerts a certain influence on choice in sex- 

 ual passion. As to the plant, which cannot choose, we have to take 

 account of natural selection by man, whose culture promotes the pres- 

 eiwation of the species most agreeable to the eye ; we may even admit 

 a certain selection by insects, which assist the transfer of the pollen, 

 and are perhaps not wholly insensible to size among flowers, to their 

 brilliancy of color, etc. 



Can an argument against Darwinism be founded on the equality 

 of vitality among different species ? When selection has induced a 

 very considerable difference between two varieties, developing in two 

 more or less opposite directions, it often occurs that these two varie- 

 ties or species no longer have the same conditions of existence, and 

 cease to compete with each other. The farther apart the types grow, 



