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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



us. This results from the quality of 

 the knowledge he imparts, which is sci- 

 ence, or knowledge that can ho shown 

 to- he true. It is felt that so much, at 

 all events, is gained. So far we can all 

 agree. 



The question now arises, How far 

 can this platform of solid and irresisti- 

 ble truth be widened ? The discov- 

 ery and organization of this certain 

 knowledge have been the work of 

 the past three centuries, and its fur- 

 ther expansion is the great work of the 

 present time. Is it to be equally the 

 task of the future, and is science in- 

 definitely progressive ? Is law univer- 

 sal and ascertainable, and are we to go 

 on creating new knowledge of this 

 kind, and reconstructing the older 

 knowledges, until they shall take on 

 the form and character of science ? Or, 

 are there limits, and have we reached 

 them ? The question, as all must see, 

 is simply one of the extent of the order 

 of natural law, for, wherever there are 

 method and law, there is possibility of 

 science. Prof. Tyndall represents, first 

 of all, our sure ground of knowledge 

 and then its certain and safe exten- 

 sion. 



Mr. Froude, on the other hand, rep- 

 resents opposite ideas and modes of 

 thought. He deals with the past rath- 

 er than the present with human 

 events in their variable, obscure, and 

 uncertain course, rather than with 

 that side of the world in which law 

 and order can be clearly shown. He 

 represents the debatable and unsettled 

 in human affairs, and that which will 

 be forever debated, and can never be 

 settled. Hence, no sooner does he open 

 his mouth, than dispute arises, and a 

 hubbub of contradiction and conten- 

 tion has followed him whithersoever 

 he has gone. Mr. Froude gives lessons 

 in what he calls "history," but his 

 teachings do not enforce assent. At 

 this we cannot complain, for he him- 

 self believes that there is neither law, 

 order, nor science in his chosen field 



of labor. He belongs to the anti- 

 quated, historical school, which was in 

 the ascendant long before science arose, 

 and is contented to delve in the rubbish 

 of the past, with no guiding light from 

 principles that science has disclosed, and 

 which even scouts all possibility of such 

 guidance. Mr. Froude gave a lecture 

 upon this subject before the Royal In- 

 stitution, in 1864, attacking the views 

 of those who hold that there is such a 

 thing as a science of history and of so- 

 cial polity, which, although still in an 

 indefinite stage, is yet as certain in the 

 future as the progress of knowledge 

 itself. The reader, who will turn to 

 the June number of the Monthly, will 

 find a convincing refutation, by Herbert 

 Spencer, of Mr. Froude's position ; and, 

 as the subject is just now one of public 

 interest, we reproduce some passages 

 from an able lecture of Mr. John Fiske, 

 of Cambridge, upon the same subject: 



" Mr. Froude begins by dogmatically de- 

 nying that there is or can be such a thing a.s 

 a science of history. There is something 

 incongruous, he says, in the very connec- 

 tion of the two words. ' It is as if we were 

 to talk of the color of sound, or the longi- 

 tude of the rule of three.' But he carries 

 on the thought in a way that shows plainly 

 his reluctance to grapple fairly with the 

 problem. In his next sentence he says : 

 1 Where it is so difficult to make out the 

 truth on the commonest disputed facts in 

 matters passing under our very eyes, how 

 can we talk of a science in things long past, 

 which come to us only through books ? ' 

 Now, to reason like this is merely to shrink 

 from the encounter. For the question is, 

 not whether the science is difficult, but 

 whether it is possible. Mr. Froude sets 

 out to show that there can be no such 

 science, and his first bit of proof is that, 

 if there is such a science, it must be far 

 more difficult than any other ; a position 

 which we may contentedly grant. Let us 

 follow him a step further. ' It often seems 

 to me as if history were like a child's box 

 of letters, with which we can spell any word 

 we please. "We have only to pick out such 

 letters as we want, arrange them as we like, 

 and say nothing about those which do not 

 suit our purpose.' And what does all this 

 amount to? Is this Mr. Froude's idea of 



