EDITORS TABLE. 



37? 



historical investigation? Why, the same 

 thing may be done in any science. We 

 have only to pick out all the facts on one 

 side, and blink all the facts on the other 

 side, to prove the veracity of every oracle, 

 soothsayer, and clairvoyant, that ever ex- 

 isted, the validity of every paltry omen, the 

 credibility of every crazy notion of alchemy 

 or judicial astrology. In this way we may 

 prove that the homceopathist always saves 

 his patient, while the allopathist always 

 kills him ; or vice versa. And it was in this 

 way that the phrenologists erected their 

 pseudo-science. It is in this way that 

 every charlatanry, as well as every incor- 

 rect or inadequate hypothesis in physical or 

 mental science, has arisen and gained tem- 

 porary recognition. Mr. Froude ought to 

 know that, in history as in every thing 

 else, our only road to a safe conclusion lies 

 through the impartial examination of all 

 relevant facts. Supposing Tycho Brahe 

 had said to his Copernican antagonists : 

 ' Astronomy is like a child's box of let- 

 ters ; if we take out what we want and let 

 the rest go, we can spell whatever we please ; 

 I spell out the Ptolemaic theory, and will 

 therefore abide by it ; ' he would have been 

 talking much after the manner of Mr. Froude. 

 It is true, as Mr. Froude says, that one phi- 

 losopher believes in progress, a second in re- 

 trogression, and a third, like Vico, in ever- 

 recurring cycles. But is this because the 

 facts are undecipherable, or because the in- 

 vestigation is one-sided ? Because Prof. 

 Agassiz believes species to be fixed, while 

 the majority of naturalists believe them to 

 be transmutable, are we to infer that there 

 is no science of biology ? In such unworthy 

 plight does Mr. Froude retreat before the 

 problem he has encountered. He starts to 

 show us that a science of history is as ridic- 

 ulous an impossibility as a scarlet B flat or a 

 westerly proportion, and he ends by mildly 

 observing that history is a difficult subject, 

 in which a series of partial examinations 

 may bring forth contradictory conclusions I 

 " The next bit of inference concerns us 

 more intimately : * Will a time ever be 

 when the lost secret of the foundation of 

 Borne can be recovered by historic laws ? 

 If not, where is our science ? ' Just where 

 it was before. The science of history has 

 nothing to do with dates, except to take 

 them, so far as they can be determined, 

 from the hands of historical criticism. 

 They are its data, not its conclusions. As 

 Mr. Morley reminds us, we do not dispute 

 the possibility of a science of meteorology, 

 because such a science cannot tell us whether 



it was a dry day or a wet day at Jericho two 

 thousand years ago. Facts like these show 

 us that sciences dealing with phenomena, 

 which are the products t>f many and com- 

 plex factors, cannot hope to attain that 

 minute precision which is attained by sci- 

 ences dealing with phenomena which are 

 the products of few and simple factors. 

 They show that sociology cannot, like 

 astronomy, be brought under the control 

 of mathematical deduction. But it was not 

 necessary for Mr. Froude to write an essay 

 to prove that. 



" But, continues Mr. Froude, ' can you 

 imagine a science which would have fore- 

 told such movements as' Mohammedan- 

 ism, or Christianity, or Buddhism ? To the 

 question as thus presented, we must an- 

 swer, certainly not. Neither can any man 

 foretell any such movement as the typhoid 

 fever which six months hence is to strike 

 him down. If the latter case does net prove 

 that there are no physiologic laws, neither 

 does the former prove that there are no laws 

 of history. In both instances the antece- 

 dents of the phenomenon are irresistibly 

 working out their results ; though, in both 

 cases, they are so complicated that no human 

 skill can accurately anticipate their course. 

 But to a different presentment of Mr. Froude's 

 question we might return a different answer. 

 There is a sense in which movements like 

 Mohammedanism and Buddhism, or Chris- 

 tianity, could not have been predicted, and 

 there is a sense in which they could have 

 been. What could not have been predicted 

 was the peculiar character impressed upon 

 these movements by the gigantic personal- 

 ities of such men as Mohammed and Omar, 

 Sakyamuni, Jesus, and Paul. What coidd 

 have been predicted was the general char- 

 acter and direction of the movements. For 

 example, as I shall show in a future lecture, 

 Christianity as a universal religion was not 

 possible until Eome had united in a single 

 commonwealth the progressive nations of 

 the world. And, when Eome -had accom- 

 plished this task, it might well have been 

 predicted that before long a religion would 

 arise which should substitute monotheism 

 for polytheism, proclaiming the universal 

 fatherhood of God and the universal broth- 

 erhood of men. I admit that such a predic- 

 tion could have been made only by a person 

 familiar with scientific modes of thought not 

 then in existence ; but, could such a person 

 have been present to contemplate the phe- 

 nomena, he might have foreseen such a rev- 

 olution in its main features, as being an in- 

 evitable result of tho interaction of Jewish. 



