37 6 



THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



Ilel'lenic, and Roman ideas. I am inclined 

 to think he might have foreseen that it 

 would arise in Palestine, that its spread 

 would he confined to the area covered by 

 Roman civilization, and that its work would 

 be most thorough in the most thoroughly- 

 Romanized regions. 



"I would not, however, insist upon this 

 point ; nor is it necessary to do so. In 

 none of the concrete sciences is there any 

 thing like thorough and systematic previ- 

 sion, save in astronomy ; and even in astron- 

 omy our foresight becomes precarious as 

 soon as we pass beyond the solar system 

 and begin to inquire into the mutual grav- 

 itation of the innumerable stellar bodies. 

 We know that our sun is rushing with im- 

 mense velocity toward the constellation 

 Hercules ; but we cannot yet trace his orbit 

 as Kepler traced the orbit of Mars. When 

 we come to biology and psychology, the 

 power of accurate prevision is very small ; 

 yet no one denies that the phenomena of 

 life and intelligence conform to fixed and 

 ascertainable laws. In sociology we must 

 expect to find still less ability to predict. 

 The truth is, as Comte acutely pointed out, 

 that while in the simpler sciences our object 

 is gained if we can foretell the course of 

 phenomema so as to be able to regulate our 

 actions by it, in the more complex sciences 

 our object is gained when we have general- 

 ized the conditions under which phenomena 

 occur so as to be able to make our volitions 

 count for something in modifying them. 

 "We cannot modify astronomic phenomena, 

 but we can predict them. We cannot pre- 

 dict, save to a limited extent, biologic phe- 

 nomena ; but, knowing more and more thor- 

 oughly the conditions under which they occur, 

 we can more and more skilfully modify them 

 so as to insure health or overcome disease. 

 And obviously even this limited ability to 

 modify the phenomena implies a certain 

 amount of prevision, enough to justify us 

 m asserting that the phenomena conform 

 to law. The case is similar in sociology. 

 Though we may not be able definitely to 

 predict a given political revolution, we may, 

 nevertheless, understand the general move- 

 ment of affairs, and the effects which certain 

 kinds of legislation are likely to produce, so 

 as to hasten a desired result or avert social 

 mischief. Upon this possibility are based 

 all our methods of government and of edu- 

 cation. And, as in biology, this ability to 

 modify the phenomena proves that the 

 phenomena occur in some fixed order of 

 sequence. For, where there is no definite 

 order of sequence among phenomena, we 



can neither predict nor modify them ; and, 

 where there is a definite order of sequence, 

 there is, or may be, a science. 



" Now, in denying that there is or can be 

 a science of history, Mr. Froude, if he means 

 any thing, means that social affairs have no 

 fixed order of sequence, but are the sport of 

 chance. Either Law or Chance these are 

 the only alternatives, unless we have re- 

 course, like the Mussulman, to Destiny, an 

 illegitimate third idea, made up of the other 

 two, misconceived and mutilated in order to 

 fit together. But for the modern thinker 

 there is no middle course. It is either sym- 

 metry or confusion, law or chance, and be- 

 tween the two antagonist conceptions there 

 can be no compromise. If the law of causa 

 tion is universal, we must accept the theory 

 of law. If it has ever, in any one instance, 

 been violated, we may be excused for tak 

 ing up with the theory of chance. Now, we 

 know that all the vast bodies in this sidereal 

 universe move on for untold ages in their 

 orbits in strict conformity to law. In con- 

 formity to law the solar system in all its 

 complexity has grown out of a homogeneous 

 nebula ; and the crust of the cooling earth 

 has condensed into a rigid surface fit for the 

 maintenance of organic life. Out of plastic 

 materials furnished by tb^s surface, and the 

 air and moisture by which it is enveloped, 

 organic life has arisen and been multiplied 

 in countless differing forms, all in accord- 

 ance with law. Of this aggregate of organic 

 existence, man, the most complex and per- 

 fect type, lives and moves and has his be- 

 ing in strict conformity to law. His periods 

 of activity and repose are limited by cosmic 

 rotations. His achievements, physical and 

 mental, are determined by the rate of his 

 nutrition, and by the molecular structure 

 and relative weight of the nervous matter 

 contained in him. His very thoughts must 

 chase each other along definite paths and 

 contiguous channels marked out by the laws 

 of association. Throughout these various 

 phenomena, already generalized for us by 

 astronomers, geologists, biologists, and psy- 

 chologists, we know that neither at any 

 time nor in any place is law interfered 

 with that yesterday, to-day, and forever, 

 the effect follows the cause with inevitable 

 and inexorable certainty. And yet wo are 

 asked to believe that in one particular corner 

 of the universe, upon the surface of our lit- 

 tle planet, in a portion of the organism of 

 one particular creature, there is one special 

 phenomenon, called volition, in whieh the 

 law of causation ceases to operate, and 

 every thing goes helter-skelter I " 





