18 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



PEOFESSOE GOLDWIJNT SMITH AS A CEITIC. 



By HERBERT SPENCER. 



I 



N the pref ace to the " Data of Ethics " there occurs the following 

 sentence : 



AVith a view to clearness, I have treated separately some correlative aspects 

 of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced 

 from the other, and have thus given abundant opportunity for misrepresentation. 



When I wrote this sentence, I little dreamed that Professor. Gold- 

 win Smith would be the man to verify my expectation more fully than 

 I expected it to be verified by the bitterest bigot among those classed 

 as orthodox. 



I do not propose here to enter upon a controversy. I propose sim- 

 ply to warn readers that, before accepting Professor Goldwin Smith's 

 versions of my views, it will be well to take the precaution of refer- 

 ring to the views as expressed by myself, to see whether the two cor- 

 respond. And, by way of showing that this warning is called for, I 

 will give them the opportunity of comparing representation with real- 

 ity in a single instance. 



In his article in the last number of this " Eeview," and on page 

 340, he characterizes the doctrine I have set forth in these words : 



An authoritative conscience, duty, virtue, obligation, principle, and rectitude 

 of motive, no more enter into his definitions, or form parts of his system, than 

 does the religious sanction. 



Before going further, let the reader dwell a moment on this state- 

 ment, and consider the full implication of its words. Let him ask 

 himself what kind of conclusions he would look for in a system of 

 ethics which does not recognize " an authoritative conscience " ; what 

 ideas of right and wrong are likely to be found in a treatise on con- 

 duct which excludes "duty" and "virtue"; what he thinks must be 

 the general traits of a moral doctrine in which "principle" has no 

 place. Then, when he has fully impressed himself with the meaning 

 of Professor Smith's words, and imagined the kind of teaching indi- 

 cated by them, let him observe the teaching he actually finds. The 

 following passage, from chapter ix of the " Data of Ethics," will pre- 

 pare the way for more specific passages : 



It is quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate aim of action, 

 and at the same time to deny that it can be reached by making it the immediate 

 aim. I go with Mr. Sidgwick as far as the conclusion that "we must at least 

 admit the desirability of confirming or correcting the results of such compari- 

 sons [of pleasures and pains] by any other method upon which we may find rea- 

 son to rely " ; and I then go further and say that, throughout a large part of 

 conduct, guidance by such comparisons is to be entirely set aside and replaced 

 by other guidance (pp. 155, 156). 



