SPECULATIVE SCIEXCE. 147 



other ; that the latter theory fails in the presence of the facts, and 

 that all attempts to remove this conflict have, thus far at least, been 

 abortive. 



After supplementing these preliminaries by a discussion of the 

 atomic theory and its dependant, the kinetic theory of gases, I ap- 

 proach the problem whose solution is the sole aim of my little treatise, 

 which, as is expressly stated in the very first sentence of the preface, 

 is designed as a contribution, not to physics or metaphysics, but to the 

 theory of cognition. That problem is the determination of the logical 

 and psychological origin of the mechanical theory, and of its attitude 

 toward the laws of thought and the forms and conditions of its evolu- 

 tion. It is neither necessary nor practicable here to attempt a repro- 

 duction of the tenor of my discussion. It is sufficient for my present 

 purpose to state my conclusion, which is, that the mechanical theory 

 with all its implications is founded on a total disregard or misapprehen- 

 sion of the true relation of thoughts to things or of concepts to phys- 

 ical realities ; that, so far from being a departure from and standing in 

 antagonism to metaphysical speculation, the propositions which lie at 

 its base are simply exemplifications of the fallacies that vitiate all 

 metaphysical or ontological reasoning properly so called. There is 

 hardly a page in the book, after the first two expository chapters, in 

 which my utter repudiation of the mechanical theory and its funda- 

 mental assumptions is not couspicuous. My objections to this theory 

 are stated in so many ways, and are enforced by so many considera- 

 tions, that my position in regard to it appears to me insusceptible of 

 misapprehension even by the most hebetated intellect. During the 

 last six weeks I have received more than twenty letters from various 

 persons most of them mathematicians and physicists, but a few of 

 them persons without scientific training in which the doctrines of my 

 book are discussed or questioned, sometimes on grounds which indicate 

 that my meaning has been strangely misapprehended. But not one of 

 these letters gives rise to the least suspicion that the writer was mis- 

 taken as to mv attitude toward the mechanical theory. 



And now, what does Professor Xewcomb represent my position to 

 be ? The reader who has not seen his article will be amazed when I 

 tell him that, according to him, my book was written for the purpose 

 of maintaining the propositions of the atomo-mechanical theory, and 

 of subverting the whole science of physics by means of them, on the 

 principle, I suppose, that if the facts do not agree with the theory, so 

 much the worse for the facts ! Here is Professor XewcomVs lan- 

 guage : ' 



The author's criticism is wholly destructive ; where he constructs it is only 

 to destroy. It is true that his first chapter on the atomo-mechanical theory lays 

 down certain propositions already mentioned which he seems to hold as true. 

 He makes use of them to destroy the whole fabric of modern physics, and show 

 physical investigators generally to be the subjects of miserable delusions. But 



