ON JUSTICE. 185 



it long continues restless. Generalizing these instances we see 

 that in proportion as the restraints on actions by which life is 

 maintained are extreme, the resistances to them are great. Con- 

 versely, the eagerness with which a bird seizes the opportunity 

 for taking flight, and the joy of a dog when liberated, show how 

 strong is the love of unfettered movement. 



Displaying like feelings in like ways, man displays them in 

 other and wider ways. He is irritated by invisible restraints as 

 well as by visible ones ; and as his evolution becomes higher, he 

 is affected by circumstances and actions which in more remote 

 ways aid or hinder the pursuit of ends. A parallel will elucidate 

 this truth. Primitively the sentiment of property is gratified 

 only by possession of food and shelter, and, presently, of cloth- 

 ing ; but afterward it is gratified by possession of the weapons 

 and tools which aid in obtaining these, then by possession of the 

 raw materials serving for making weapons and tools and for 

 other purposes, then by possession of the coin which purchases 

 them as well as things at large, then by possession of promises 

 to pay exchangeable for the coin, then by a lien on a banker, regis- 

 tered in a pass-book. That is, there comes to be pleasure in an 

 ownership more and more abstract and remote from material sat- 

 isfactions. Similarly with the sentiment of justice. Beginning 

 with the joy felt in ability to use the bodily powers and gain the 

 resulting benefits, accompanied by irritation at direct interfer- 

 ences, this gradually responds to wider relations: being excited 

 now by the incidents of personal bondage, now by those of politi- 

 cal bondage, now by those of class privilege, and now by small 

 political changes. Eventually, this sentiment, sometimes so little 

 developed in the negro that he jeers at a liberated companion 

 because he has no master to take care of him, becomes so much 

 developed in the Englishman that the slightest infraction of some 

 mode of formal procedure at a public meeting or in Parliament 

 which can not intrinsically concern him, is vehemently opposed 

 because in some distant and indirect way it may help to give 

 possible powers to unnamed authorities who may perhaps impose 

 unforeseen burdens or restrictions. 



Clearly, then, the egoistic sentiment of justice is a subjective 

 attribute which answers to that objective requirement consti- 

 tuting justice — the requirement that each adult shall receive the 

 good and evil effects of his own nature. For unless the faculties 

 of all kinds have free play, these results can not be gained or suf- 

 fered, and unless there exists a sentiment which prompts mainte- 

 nance of the sphere for this free play, it will be trenched upon 

 and the free play impeded. 



While we may thus understand how the egoistic sentiment of 

 justice is developed, it is much less easy to understand how there 



