ON JUSTICE. 189 



nate the altruistic sentiment, of justice are perpetually seared by- 

 militant activities. Contrariwise, in proportion as the regime of 

 status is replaced by the regime of contract, or, in other words, as 

 fast as voluntary co-operation, which characterizes the industrial 

 type of society, becomes more general than involuntary co-opera- 

 tion, which characterizes the militant type of society, individual 

 activities become less restrained, and the sentiment which rejoices 

 in the scope for them is encouraged ; while, simultaneously, the 

 occasions for repressing the sympathies become less frequent. 

 Hence during warlike phases of social life the sentiment of jus- 

 tice retrogrades, while it advances during peaceful phases, and can 

 reach its full development only in a permanently peaceful state.* 



V. The Idea of Justice. — While describing the sentiment 

 of justice, the way has been prepared for describing the idea of 

 justice. Though the two are intimately connected they may be 

 clearly distinguished. 



One who had dropped his pocket-book, and, turning round, 

 finds that another who has picked it up will not surrender it, is 

 indignant. If the goods sent home by a shopkeeper are not those 

 he purchased, he protests against the fraud. Should his seat at a 

 theatre be usurped during a momentary absence he feels himself 

 ill-used. Morning noises from a neighbor's poultry he complains 

 of as grievances. And meanwhile he sympathizes with the anger 

 of a friend who has been led by false statements to join a disas- 

 trous enterprise, or whose action at law has been rendered futile 

 by a flaw in the procedure. But though in these cases his sense 

 of justice is offended, he may fail to distinguish the essential trait 

 which in each case causes the offense. He may have the senti- 

 ment of justice in full measure while his idea of justice remains 

 vague. 



This relation between sentiment and idea is a matter of course. 

 The ways in which men trespass on one another become more nu- 

 merous in their kinds, and more involved, as society grows more 

 complex ; and they must be experienced in their many forms, gen- 

 eration after generation, before analysis can make clear the essen- 

 tial distinction between legitimate acts and illegitimate acts. 



A special reason for this should be recognized. Ideas as well 

 as sentiments must on the average be adjusted to the social state. 

 Hence, as war has been frequent or habitual in nearly all societies, 

 such ideas of justice as have existed have been perpetually con- 



* Permanent peace does in a few places exist, and where it exists the sentiment of jus- 

 tice is exceptionally strong and sensitive. I am glad to have again the occasion for point- 

 ing out that among tribes called uncivilized, there are some, distinguished by the entire 

 absence of warlike activities, who in their characters put to shame the peoples called 

 civilized. In Political Institutions, §§ 437 and 574, I have given eight examples of this 

 connection of facts taken from races of different types. 



