THE EARLIEST ORGANIC MOVEMENTS. 459 



mental functions, but functions of the mind-brain union, of the total 

 psychophysical organism. It is not a detached mind that knows and 

 remembers, but the living organism, embodied soul and ensouled 

 body. We never find reasoning where there is no mind ; but neither do 

 we find it where there is no body. If, then, I am allowed to interpret 

 'consciousness' in this way, T can, although I hold the theory of con- 

 comitance, subscribe to everything that the interactionist says of the 

 survival value of consciousness. An organism that remembers will cer- 

 tainly, other things equal, get the better, in the struggle for existence, 

 of an organism that cannot remember. Only, the real question re- 

 mains: does the remembering animal survive because it consciously 

 remembers, or because its brain is capable of those complicated proc- 

 esses which form the substrate of conscious memory? Parallelism 

 maintains that the concomitant mental processes make no difference to 

 the result. Interactionism has to maintain, in this concrete form of 

 the 'survival theory,' that the mental process as such is an aid to evolu- 

 tion; that the function which is psychophysical helps the organism 

 onwards, on that account, more than the function which is physical; 

 that consciousness, just because it is mental process, furthers life and 

 progress. On any other formulation than this parallelism and inter- 

 action join hands, — for any other formulation begs the whole question. 

 And in this formulation, as asserting that a mental process may be 

 interpolated as a causal link between two physical processes, the theory 

 of interaction seems to me to be weaker than its rival. 



The foregoing paragraphs are not intended to convert or convince 

 the reader; each theory has its peculiar difficulties, the discussion of 

 which here would lead me too far afield.* They are merely a brief ex- 

 pression of a scientific creed. Such an expression is, I think, a neces- 

 sary prolegomenon to the special problem of this paper. 



One other prefatory remark must be made. I shall often speak, in 

 what follows, as if the problem of the origin and development of 

 organic movements were identical with that of the origin and develop- 

 ment of mind at large. In many contexts this identification holds. 

 For it is an universally admitted fact — sometimes raised to the dignity 

 of a law, as the 'law of dynamogenesis' — that there can be no intake 

 on the organism's part without corresponding output ; the action of any 

 appreciable stimulus has its reaction of motor discharge. The simpler 

 the organism, the clearer is this correlation; but it holds through- 



* A good popular account of psychophysical parallelism is given by H. 

 Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge der Psychologic, I., i., 1897, 41-47. The strongest 

 attack made upon the theory in recent years is that of C. Stumpf 's ' Eroff nungs- 

 rede,' printed in the 'Bericht iiber den III. internationalen Congress fiir Psy- 

 chologic,' 1897. I say nothing in the text of Interactionism as a static (op- 

 posed to genetic) theory. The reader must pardon this and other sins of omis- 

 sion, on the score of necessary brevity. 



