46o POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



out.* It follows, then, that there can be no consciousness without move- 

 ment, though there may, of course, be movement without consciousness. 



If we turn, now, to the question of the character of the earliest 

 organic movements, we find, again, that two views are current. It is 

 maintained, on the one hand, that mind is as old as life. The first 

 movement of the first organism must, then, if it exceeded a certain 

 liminal extent, have been attended by some sort of consciousness. Let 

 us say, in round terms, that the first locomotion of the first vagrant 

 organism must have been accompanied by mental process. It is main- 

 tained, on the other hand, that the first movements are more akin to 

 the movements that physiologists term 'refiexes,' direct and uncon- 

 scious responses to stimulation; and that mental process appeared at 

 some relatively high stage of organic development, when the conflicting 

 demands upon the organism could no longer be met by such direct re- 

 sponse, but led to tensions and inhibitions, in a word, to 'hesitancy' of 

 movement. The parallelist will naturally incline to accept the first 

 hypothesis ; the interactionist, to accept the second. What are the argu- 

 ments ? 



Let us look, first of all, at some of the arguments for an uncon- 

 scious first movement. (1) One of the most insistent is the appeal to 

 the law of parsimony. If we can start organic movement with some- 

 thing like the reflex, it is urged, is it not our bounden duty to do so, 

 and thus to work out our problem with the fewest possible terms? If 

 life is conceivable without consciousness, ought we not so to conceive 

 it, instead of dragging in a superfluous 'mind'? As a purely formal 

 argument, the appeal to parsimony may be met by the counter-appeal 

 to the law of continuity. It is no more impressive to say, in the 

 abstract, 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda prseter necessitatem,' than it is 

 to say 'Natura non facit saltum.' But the argument is, of course, 

 more than purely formal. It suggests, as adequate and as the simplest 

 possible, a certain definite interpretation of the facts. It throws upon 

 parallelism the burden of proving the necessity of mind at the first 

 appearance of life. 



The parallelist might meet this challenge by raising the previous 

 question. The facts to be interpreted are natural phenomena, and 

 nature is not bound by any law of parsimony. Indeed, the prodigality 

 of nature is fully as evident as her frugality : witness the prolongation 

 of life beyond the period of reproductiveness, the enormous range of 

 our sensations of tone, the genius lavished on pure mathematics. It is 

 at least possible that, in the present instance, nature is less economical 

 in action than we strive to be in thought; that, in giving us life, she 



* Cf. J. M. Baldwin, 'Mental Development,' etc.. Methods and Processes, 

 1895, 166. 



