i 4 4 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



ginner's mind a comprehension of its scope and purpose as concrete as 

 possible. I can think of no better way of accomplishing this than by 

 stating at the outset that the business of logic is to formulate and sys- 

 tematically present the methods of our thinking for the purpose of 

 acquiring knowledge of the correct methods and skill in their use. This 

 would make logic a science, treating its subject matter descriptively 

 rather than philosophically. 



Then proceeding to what is properly the first division of logic, 

 namely, the study of words or terms, it should be made clear that logic 

 treats language from the standpoint of meaning. In reality, logic, so 

 far as its discussion of terms and propositions extends, is one of the 

 trinity of subjects which have to do with the use of language. Its rela- 

 tion to grammar and rhetoric may be best made clear by regarding as 

 the primary interest of logic the function of words as expressing the 

 thought of the speaker or writer. Of course, logical analysis is insep- 

 arable from the correct teaching of grammar and rhetoric. But the 

 actual practise is frequently such as to warrant the criticism that sense 

 is sacrificed to grammatical and rhetorical niceties. One is also re- 

 minded of that portion of Mr. Huxley's criticism of the teaching of 

 English literature at Oxford, where he writes : " I venture to doubt the 

 wisdom of attempting to mold one's style by any other process than 

 that of striving after clear and forcible expression of definite concep- 

 tions ; in which process the Glassian precept, i first catch your concep- 

 tions,' is probably the most difficult to obey."* 



If students take up logic with the idea, carried over from their 

 study of grammar and their use of dictionaries, that words get their 

 character as nouns, or verbs, or what not, from their origin or form, 

 they should be made to understand early that it is quite an erroneous 

 idea. " The logical character of a name is not something fixed and 

 stable, but quite the reverse. It is function, not structure, that de- 

 termines logical character, and the function of words in asserting is 

 variable. The different actual uses of names are what logic needs to 

 distinguish, not different sorts of names apart from their actual use, 

 words in their context, not words as grammar conceives them or as 

 they lie side by side in a dictionary. . . . Since words are adaptable 

 instruments of assertion, and not restricted to a single function, we 

 might as well ask whether a penny stamp in the pocket is a receipt 

 stamp or a postage stamp, as ask whether a word apart from its par- 

 ticular use has this or that logical character."! The logical treatment 

 of terms is essentially the question of how they are used in this or that 

 connection. 



* ' Life and Letters,' vol. 2, p. 302. 



f Sidgwick, ' Use of Words in Reasoning,' p. 243. 



