THE TEACHING OF LOGIC. 145 



The same point of view should be maintained when we come to the 

 next division of logic— the study of propositions. Here, likewise, the 

 meaning side of language, and not the form, is of primary interest. 

 Many students have difficulty in realizing that the meaning of a prop- 

 osition does not depend upon its form ; that affirmative, or negative, or 

 categorical forms are not necessarily expressions of affirmative, or nega- 

 tive, or categorical thoughts. For example, the last clause of the verse, 

 ' Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto 

 life; and few there be that find it/ is very frequently interpreted as 

 meaning ' some do find it/ 



In this connection there is another not uncommon error, namely, 

 that of regarding two propositions, worded differently, as different 

 assertions, when, in fact, they assert the same thing. 



But traditional logic is of little help in the whole matter of logical 

 analysis. For instance, its treatment of conversion makes dry reading 

 and a perfunctory task for the student. It is even worse ; it savors of 

 the artificial and useless. That a subject of such importance as con- 

 version should be presented in a way so unnatural and forbidding as 

 that of the traditional logic is much to be regretted. Logic should 

 teach in this matter, not traditional rules, nor discussions of formal 

 subtleties, but the simple truth that the Tightness or wrongness of every 

 converse rests on precisely the same basis as that of the original proposi- 

 tion, namely, known facts and laws. The proposition that ignorant 

 people are superstitious is true because it agrees with the facts. But 

 if we change it into superstitious people are ignorant we do not get a 

 good converse, because this proposition does not agree with the facts. 

 In the next place, the syllogism needs more radical change in treat- 

 ment than either of the two previously mentioned divisions of so-called 

 deductive logic. The traditional treatment has overloaded the subject 

 with dry discussions, rules and symbolical schemes, so that there is 

 hardly left the slightest appearance of any connection with actual 

 thinking. Better omit all mention of figure, mood, reduction, and 

 the question whether there are three or four figures, than miss the 

 important lesson of the syllogism. " There is little," says Mr. Sidg- 

 wick,* " that need be taught about the syllogism, since the process itself 

 — which is merely that of bringing a particular case under a general 

 rule — is used instinctively by every one from childhood onwards." 

 Examples like these, ( Five francs are a dollar, four shillings are a 

 dollar; therefore five francs are four shillings '; or, ' Some men are not 

 fools, yet all men are fallible/ are not suited to bring out the real 

 ' process/ much less to train the mind in accurately applying a general 

 truth to a particular case. In fact, too many of the arguments selected 



* Sidgwick, ' Use of Words in Reasoning,' p. 354. 

 vol. lxvii. — 10. 



