148 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



sciences is of insignificant value, and the arrangement of science 

 courses might well enough be determined by local and economic 

 conditions. 



This misconception should be classed with that of mistaking gen- 

 eral for singular terms, as is often done in the case of moral law and 

 natural law. For it regards science as all one and the same, having 

 one invariable procedure in all branches of scientific research, regard- 

 less of the peculiar nature of any particular group of phenomena. 

 Consequently a study of any one of the sciences ought to satisfy the 

 modern demand for science study and should qualify the more brilliant 

 students as competent and reliable investigators in any branch of 

 science whatsoever. If this were true, then, so far as pertains to 

 method, the chemist might at once turn psychologist and pursue his 

 work as successfully as though he had received his training in psychol- 

 ogy instead of chemistry. The ideal man of science would be the last 

 person to make any such claim. For he well knows that, besides the 

 common features of the scientific method which appear everywhere in 

 their broad outlines, there are numerous variations due to individual 

 characteristics possessed by the data of the various sciences or different 

 groups of sciences, and that to be a good scientist requires a preparation 

 in the field in which one is to work. A better understanding of these 

 facts might do much towards dispelling illusions as to a model science 

 and the superiority of one science over another. Unfortunately scien- 

 tists often assume an unscientific attitude towards one another. The 

 physicist, for example, declares that for one to undertake the scien- 

 tific study of psychical phenomena is to sound his death knell as a 

 scientist. There is much need, among investigators in the various 

 fields of human interest, of increased respect for one another's methods 

 and results ; of an intelligent conception of the peculiar conditions and 

 difficulties of problems other than one's own; and instead of ridicule 

 and depreciation, a just and cordial recognition of contributions 

 honestly made, even though they lack the precision and finality which 

 characterize results obtained elsewhere. 



In addition to an orderly presentation of scientific methods and 

 analysis of important and interesting conceptions such as the uni- 

 formity of nature, cause, hypotheses, theory, law, inductive logic should 

 make it very evident that the data of our thinking are varied, and that 

 the character of many conclusions is problematical. The facts of 

 human experience, the problems of the world at large, do not lend 

 themselves to any ' secure method ' or yield conclusions that are certain. 

 At one time we must act decisively on inferences which are far from 

 approximating to certainty; and then again when it is not a question 

 of choosing or starving, we need that suspended judgment which has 

 been called the greatest triumph of intellectual discipline. In brief, 



