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HARD WICKE' S S CIE NCE- G SSI P. 



endowed with both faculties, whilst we know man is 

 not ; and again, if the difference is only in degree, 

 how is it that as animals have been born in the 

 higher degree, i.e. with power to act "reasonably" 

 from the beginning of their birth, and thus having an 

 immense advantage over man at the starting of life, they 

 are so immensely inferior to man, who in comparison 

 is born into the lowest degree ? Taking the difference 

 as being in degree, then comparing man with monkey, 

 the highest degree is in the monkey. The uncul- 

 tured man is shown by Darwin's savage to have less 

 reason than the uncultured monkey ; this theory there- 

 fore would compel us to trace the degree in man 

 downward from the monkey, though this is hardly in 

 conformity with the theory of evolution. 



As it is capable of proof that animals can act in- 

 tuitively with sufficient apparent "reason "for their 

 wants, and, as compared with man, are incapable of 

 tuition, and that man cannot act at all intuitively, but, 

 as compared with animals, is capable of tuition to an 

 unlimited degree, it appears to me to be a fair deduc- 

 tion that the respective powers of ' ' reason " as actu- 

 ating man and animals are of so totally different a 

 nature as to be no more the same in kind than a man 

 is a species of duck because he can learn to swim. 



The incident of Darwin looking with abhorrence on 

 the savage of Tierra del Fuego, and comparing him 

 (the savage) unfavourably to a monkey, rather than 

 being a proof of the sameness of mind and instinct, is 

 a good illustration of the difference of those faculties. 

 Look on this picture : Darwin, a man, born with 

 no instinct, as far beyond the monkey (who was born 

 a thousand times cleverer than he was) as the stars 

 from the earth. Then look on that : the savage, a man 

 beneath the monkey, simply because he was born 

 without instinct, but with a mind, which from degra- 

 dation of his race he had not exercised. But he bears 

 every impress of the aptitude and attributes of man, 

 and as to mind, only differs in degree from Darwin. 

 Compare them, and then compare Ihe savage and 

 the monkey, and_then see if we cannot get a true 

 perception of what constitutes a difference in degree 

 and in kind ; if not, let us imagine a young savage and 

 a young monkey put through a course of instruction, 

 say in arithmetic, it would be an interesting study to 

 watch which would learn the "tables" first; but I 

 would back the savage. Yet, if we are to take the 

 inferiority of state of the particular savage which 

 Darwin looked on, as an instance of reason being of 

 the same nature as the instinct of monkey, I should 

 be backing at long odds. — Robert S. Gilliard. 



Intelligence in Man and Animals. — I should 

 like to make a few remarks on the above subject in 

 reply to some of your correspondents, if you can 

 afford me the necessary space. Mr. Barclay in his 

 first communication, says: " If it could be proved 

 that a dog deliberately chose one of two courses of 

 action, the case of reason would be established." 

 Now it seems to me that in their every-day actions, 

 animals frequently choose one of two courses of action. 

 For instance, if a cat is left alone in a room with a 

 bird, its natural instinct would impel it to kill the 

 bird and eat it, but it has reason enough to know 

 that such a course of action would be followed by a 

 certain punishment, the fear of which deters it from 

 doing that which mere instinct would certainly prompt 

 it to do. A dog knows very well when it has done 

 wrong, and the old saying "Like a dog with his tail 

 between his legs " is a very expressive one. It may, 

 perhaps, be said, that the animal is simply restrained 

 from doing a certain action by the fear of consequences. 

 Is it not so with man ? What would become of our 

 boasted morality, the rights of property, &c, were it 



not for the fear of consequences, here or hereafter ? 

 Mr. Barclay admits that animals possess what are 

 called moral qualities in man, but denies to the 

 unfortunate brute any praise for their possession, as 

 they are simply a part of its nature, " primal impulses." 

 If such be the case, how can the difference in the 

 disposition of animals be accounted for ? Some 

 animals are born without those "moral qualities of 

 fidelity, attachment, and courage," which, when 

 found in the lower animals, Mr. Barclay designates 

 "primal impulses," and seem to be actuated simply 

 by an unconquerable animosity to mankind in 

 general. I do not quite understand your corre- 

 spondent, Mr. P. Q. Keegan, when he says : "that 

 memory is an act of the intellect, but certainly not an 

 act of reasoning in the sense of inferring one proposi- 

 tion from another." Memory is the power reason has 

 of retaining and arranging facts which come under 

 our observation, so that they may be used when 

 required, but I certainly do not see how memory 

 could possibly exist without reason, or reason without 

 memory. Mr. Barclay admits that animals have some 

 intelligence and memory, but questions their power of 

 reasoning, which he says is the root of man's civilisa- 

 tion, and makes him a responsible being. Alas ! that 

 the power should be so perverted as it sometimes is ! 

 Has Mr. Barclay forgotten that there are various 

 races of mankind, and that all are not quite so highly 

 civilised as we are in this favoured country ? Again, 

 Mr. Barclay says: "Those who credit the lower 

 animals with reason, if they are consistent, will also 

 credit them with conscience." Why should they not 

 be credited with conscience ? As I have said before, 

 most domesticated animals know very well when they 

 have done wrong, and prepare to suffer for it, just as 

 a naughty child would do. In conclusion Mr. Barclay 

 says: "Take from man his reasoning power, latent 

 though it may be in many cases, yet underlying all his 

 conceptions, and we find the idiot who would perish 

 but for extraneous aid. Take from the quadruped the 

 modicum of reason which Mr. Darwin and others of 

 his school attribute to it, and we have an animal 

 endowed with some kind of intelligence we do not 

 understand, but name instinct." Of course, just as 

 the feeling of cold is produced by the absence of heat, 

 so if you take away a man's reasoning power, you 

 leave him a helpless idiot, without even instinct, and 

 if you take away the modicum of reason from the 

 quadruped (which Mr. Barclay denies it) you leave 

 what may be called simple instinct. Mr. Barclay 

 seems to contradict himself in his last sentence. The 

 remarks of your correspondents A. Wheatley and 

 C. L. W. are very good, and much to the point, but 

 "Idea" seems to take a poetical rather than a 

 scientific view of the subject under discussion. The 

 idea that animals really possess something more than 

 mere instinct, and are deserving of more consideration 

 than they generally receive, is certainly gaining ground 

 amongst the thinking portion of the community, and 

 to use the words of Mr. P. Q. Keegan, is seriously 

 entertained ' ' by men of the highest culture and 

 sanity." — A. C. Rogers, Southampton. 



Intelligence in Man and Animals. — Allow 

 me to correct two slight errors in my note in your 

 April issue. After the word "effect," the colon 

 should be changed to a full stop, as the words "to 

 this effect" refer to the "supernatural change" 

 previously mentioned. Also "Lopinard" should be 

 " Topinard." Your correspondent, Mr. Barclay, 

 says that the nature of the lower animals obviously 

 differed from ours. But this is not certain, excepting 

 that ours is perhaps more perfect. Animals show joy, 

 fear, hunger, pain, will, choose larger of two pieces 



