6o2 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



The common assumptions of physiognomy and phrenology (as we 

 readily detect, though not thus obvious to the minds of their defenders) 

 are these : ( 1 ) that there are distinct mental traits, qualities or capaci- 

 ties, which ordinary human intercourse and observation reveal; (2) 

 that these are caused by (or correlated with) prominent developments 

 of parts of the brain; (3) the critical assumption (presumably least ex- 

 plicit of all) that we may accept as established the relation whereby 

 the one, the bodily feature, becomes the index of the other, the mental 

 trait. The assumed principle of relation was plainly empirical, had 

 no warrant in principle. The clue in all such systems was merely a 

 sign or trade-mark displayed, in Lavater's theological view, by a benefi- 

 cent Providence to indicate the virtues and vices of men. For phrenol- 

 ogy the alleged principle was wholly different. It grew out of the 

 subdivision of the functions of the brain. The evidence, it must be 

 admitted, was sought by approved scientific methods. But the stupen- 

 dous assumption was made that the presumption in favor of the exist- 

 ence of such specialized brain-areas included a knowledge of their 

 terms, and that their nature was indicated by the specific differences 

 in the observed traits of men; further, that such mental traits, giving 

 rise to or conditioned by marked local development of brain-areas, could 

 be detected in the corresponding prominences of the skull. So 

 supremely unwarranted was this cumulative series of assumptions that 

 the scientific knowledge and procedure associated with its alleged estab- 

 lishment failed to confer upon phrenology any more respectable status 

 or accredited position than were accorded to the far more extravagant 

 assumptions of physiognomy. Clearly, if the assumptions of phrenol- 

 ogy held — itself an extravagant supposition — the study of character 

 and temperament would be completely shaped by its conclusions. Since 

 they are neither pertinent nor illuminating, physiological and psy- 

 chological studies still have a message for the student of human nature. 



The chief warrant for a further consideration of the position of 

 Gall and Spurzheim is that their views came into direct contact with 

 the advances in the knowledge of the nervous system, which — as will 

 duly appear — became the requisite for true psychological progress. 

 The central question at issue was whether the brain functioned as a 

 whole, or whether distinct functions could be assigned to its several 

 parts. The former position was defended by Flourens (1794r-1867), 

 who maintained that the removal of a part of the brain of a pigeon 

 weakened the general intelligence, but that the intact portion still 

 exercised the complete range of brain-functions, though with diminished 

 efficiency. Gall's position required a detailed and specialized division 

 of function. He drew attention to the fact that the mutilated pigeon, 

 while retaining physical sight and hearing, became mentally blind to 

 the meaning of what it was clearly able to see, and. mentally deaf to the 

 meaning of sounds; he drew attention to the important evidence sup- 



