36 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



creation from nothing have any special character ? Other things be- 

 speak their origin in their lineaments ; and, until better advised, we 

 shall continue to think that a creation out of Nothing would look un- 

 commonly like Nothing. If a man born blind were, by an act of 

 imagination or what not, to show himself quite at home in the com- 

 prehension of the phenomena of light, we should perhaps be disposed 

 to recognize an analogy to the alleged work of creation ; but we are 

 not aware that any such achievement has been recorded. That a great 

 thinker or poet should not always, if ever, understand how thoughts 

 came to group themselves in his mind in any particular way is no 

 difficulty to the evolutionist : he does not pretend to understand all 

 the mysteries of the human organization. 



One argument used by Mr. Spencer affected our author, as he tells 

 us, very strangely. As he read he could hardly trust the evidence of 

 his eye-sight ; he thought the type must have got topsy-turvy in some 

 strange fashion ; he began to distrust the accuracy of the American 

 edition of the philosopher's works, such an extraordinary example 

 did he seem to have before him of " logic run riot." No doubt it 

 was an argument that would not have told very powerfully on a jury ; 

 and that might not have brought much light even to the mind of 

 an average judge, as it certainly has been quite lost on that of a 

 distinguished lawyer ; but the argument in our humble opinion is a 

 good one, for all that. What Mr. Spencer says, to put it briefly, is 

 that the idea of creation is unthinkable because it implies a relation 

 between something and nothing. What has Mr. Curtis, after recov- 

 ering from his spasm of astonishment, to say in reply? The first 

 thing he says is that the creation of matter is not inconceivable, " if 

 we adopt the postulate of an infinite Creator." In other words, use 

 certain expressions that formally signify creation out of nothing, and 

 forthwith we have the conception, clear and workable. In the same 

 way, if we want to have the conception of a round square, we only 

 have to say "round square," and presto, thei'e it is ! Mr. Curtis wants 

 very badly to know who made the laws that have been "impressed 

 upon matter " ? But who knows that any laws have been " impressed 

 upon matter"? Who knows that that is the proper way of express- 

 ing the relation between matter and its laws ? Does Mr. Curtis know 

 it ? We doubt it ; or rather we may say that we know that he does 

 not knoic anything of the kind. By the so-called "laws of matter" 

 are meant simply the properties of matter. Perhaps Mr. Curtis thinks 

 he can conceive of matter apart from its properties, and of the prop- 

 erties apart from matter. Be that as it may, the question of the origin 

 of the properties of matter is plainly a part of the question as to the 

 origin of matter. All that Mr. Spencer says is that there is no use in 

 talking of matter, or anything else, coming out of nothing, seeing that 

 the words, w T hen you press them, will be found void of meaning. 

 When Mr. Curtis says that "the term 'creation,' as used in all modern 



