A VINDICATION OF SCIENTIFIC ETHICS. 335 



prompt them are higher, because they imply a more distinct step in 

 moral evolution, because the interest of the community is more con- 

 cerned in their performance. Now, the Professor wants to know why 

 such actions " most need to be enforced." The first thing to say in 

 answer is that such actions are not commonly " enforced " at all. The 

 acts we praise most highly are acts of patriotism, of eminent public 

 spirit, of devotion to duty under trying circumstances. The acts we 

 " enforce " are acts which, when done, we do not so highly praise, such 

 as simple fulfillment of contract, and the performance of ordinary civic 

 duties. It is possible, however, that Professor Calderwood, when he 

 uses the word " enforced," does not mean legal enforcement, but merely 

 the pressure of public opinion. His question would then be in sub- 

 stance, How is it that the actions which we most commend are those 

 which most need to be commended ? But he might as well ask how it 

 is that the actions we most condemn are those which most need to be 

 condemned ; why the actions we laugh at are those that especially call 

 for ridicule ; and so on, through a whole series of ineptitudes. Why. 

 certain actions are especially praised I have explained above, and it is 

 manifest, from the nature of the actions referred to, that this social 

 approval must powerfully reenforce the motives which prompt to such 

 actions, but which, without social support, might not have vigor enough 

 to fully assert themselves against countervailing motives. It is impos- 

 sible, in fact, to understand why the praise is given without under- 

 standing at the same time why it is needed. 



Again, Professor Calderwood can not understand how, on utilitarian 

 principles, which he regards Mr. Spencer as adopting, intention should 

 make so much difference in actions. " Two men might lose their lives 

 by the hands of two of their fellows, and we should call the one a case 

 of murder and the other a case of accidental death." Why if actions 

 are to be judged solely by their consequences ? This is almost too 

 puerile ; but, since a Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh has 

 raised the question, let me simply remark that, while the act of care- 

 lessness has no ulterior consequences, the act of felony has or will 

 have if left unpunished the direst consequences to society. Further, 

 in so far as an act of carelessness is felt to menace society as being 

 likely to lead, if unchecked, to further carelessness, we do view the 

 matter seriously, and visit it both with punishment and reprobation. 

 The shipmaster who, through carelessness, loses his ship, has his certifi- 

 cate canceled or suspended. The engine-driver or conductor, through 

 whose carelessness life is sacrificed, finds himself a criminal in the eye 

 of the law. There is this difference, however, between the worst act 

 of carelessness and an act of malignity, that, in the first case, the doer 

 of the act generally suffers more or less in its consequences, and is 

 therefore in a measure punished already ; while the willful offender 

 does not feel the wrong he has done, and consequently throws upon 

 society the whole burden of his punishment. 



