336 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



Dr. McCosh, in the " Princeton Review " (November, 1879), touches, 

 perhaps, a weak point in Mr. Spencer's book when he quotes from the 

 chapter on " Absolute and Relative Ethics " the statement that " con- 

 duct which has any concomitant of pain, or any painful consequence, is 

 partially wrong." I think we may fairly question Mr. Spencer's right 

 to take the word " wrong " and divorce it so violently from its univer- 

 sally understood meaning as he does in this passage. If he had said 

 that no action can be a perfect action " which has any concomitant of 

 pain or any painful consequence," the statement might have passed 

 with the explanation he gives. But to speak of an action which is the 

 very best that can be done under given circumstances as " partially 

 wrong," is to strain language unduly. How can it be partially wrong 

 to cite Dr. McCosh's examples to submit to an amputation in order 

 to preserve life, or to conquer a vice by painful effort ? 



Dr. McCosh is probably right, also, in holding that the teaching of 

 the chapter on "Absolute and Relative Ethics" is of somewhat ques- 

 tionable tendency, as leaving altogether too much room for what he 

 calls " the crooked casuistry of the heart." Mr. Spencer's essential 

 meaning I hold to be right ; but I hardly think that, considering the 

 novelty of his views, he has been sufficiently guarded in his use of lan- 

 guage. He might have said, without in any way betraying his funda- 

 mental principles : " The distinction between right and wrong is one 

 that emerges in the region of human, and particularly of social, life ; 

 though right and wrong actions, considered as respectively making for 

 or against the preservation and improvement of life, have their ana- 

 logues in regions lower than the human. A perfect action is one all 

 the consequences and relations of which are satisfactory, as tending to 

 happiness or life ; and, therefore, no action which has any accompani- 

 ment of pain though the motive of the doer may be of the highest 

 can be a perfect action. The motive is pure and good, but it has a 

 setting of painful circumstances, and the action as a whole belongs to 

 an imperfect system of life. In practical life we have often to choose 

 between evils, but he who does not choose for the best, when he sees it, 

 violates the highest law of existence." The gist of Mr. Spencer's teach- 

 ing, in so far as it assumes a moral character, might, I think, be summed 

 up in these words. Taking the book as a whole, and looking, as we 

 are bound to do, at its inner sense, it must, I think, be acknowledged 

 that, while it does not deal with motives or the subjective aspect of 

 morality, the view which it presents of the connections of moral action, 

 the width of its survey over nature, the conclusive manner in which it 

 demonstrates the healthfulness of what is right and the Tightness of 

 what is healthful, should tend to confirm in right determinations even 

 those who miss from it what they deem of most importance. To those, 

 on the other hand, who have long been wistfully looking for an expo- 

 sition of the natural laws and sanctions of morality, it will be a word 

 spoken with power, and in many ways a help toward higher life. There 



