CRITICISMS CORRECTED. 795 



CRITICISMS CORRECTED. 



By HERBERT SPENCER. 

 I. TAIT AND K1RKMAN. 



ONE way of estimating the validity of a critic's judgments is that 

 of studying his mental peculiarities as generally displayed. If 

 he betrays idiosyncrasies of thought in his writings at large, it may be 

 inferred that these idiosyncrasies possibly, if not probably, give a char- 

 acter to the verdicts he passes upon the productions of others. I am led 

 to make this remark by considering the probable connection between 

 Professor Tait's 'habit of mind as otherwise shown and as sbown in the 

 opinion he has tacitly expressed respecting the formula of evolution. 



Daily carrying on experimental researches, Professor Tait is pro- 

 foundly impressed with the supreme value of the experimental method ; 

 and has reached the conviction that by it alone can any physical knowl- 

 edge be gained. Though he calls the ultimate truths of physics " axi- 

 oms," yet, not very consistently, he alleges that only by observation 

 and experiment can these " axioms " be known as such. Passing over 

 this inconsistency, however, we have here to note the implied proposi- 

 tion that, where no observation or experiment is possible, no physical 

 truth can be established ; and, indeed, that in the absence of any pos- 

 sibility of experiment or observation there is no basis for any physical 

 belief at all. Now, "The Unseen Universe," a work written by him 

 in conjunction with Professor Balfour Stewart, contains an elaborate 

 argument concerning the relations between the universe which is 

 visible to us and an invisible universe. This argument, carried on in 

 pursuance of physical laws established by converse with the universe 

 we know, extends them to the universe we do not know : the law of 

 the conservation of energy, for example, being regarded as common 

 to the two, and the principle of continuity, which is traced among 

 perceptible phenomena, being assumed to hold likewise of the imper- 

 ceptible. On the strength of these reasonings, conclusions are drawn 

 which are considered as at least probable : support is found for certain 

 theological beliefs. Now, clearly, the relation between the seen and 

 the unseen universes can not be the subject of any observation or ex- 

 periment ; since, by the definition of it, one term of the relation is 

 absent. If we have, then, no warrant for asserting a physical axiom 

 save as a generalization of results of experiments if, consequently, 

 where no observation or experiment is possible, reasoning after physical 

 methods can have no place then there can be no basis for any con- 

 clusion respecting the physical relations of the seen and the unseen 

 universes. Not so, however, concludes Professor Tait. He thinks 

 that, while no validity can be claimed for our judgments respecting 



