8 4 -< 



THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



EDITOR'S TABLE. 



THE CLAIMS OF SCIENCE. 



IN the present day, when so many 

 schemes for the reformation of so- 

 ciety are on foot, and so many experi- 

 ments are heing made in the treatment 

 of social diseases, it is of the very first 

 importance that the claims of science to 

 an authoritative voice in human affairs 

 should be faithfully and adequately pre- 

 sented. The efforts which such writers 

 as Spencer and Huxley have made in 

 this direction are known to all well-in- 

 formed persons, but there is still room 

 for the enforcement of the lesson, and 

 we welcome the appearance of a new 

 and vigorous champion of the good 

 cause in Prof. Karl Pearson, author of 

 the Grammar of Science, recently pub- 

 lished in the Contemporary Science 

 Series. There are many points touched 

 upon in Prof. Pearson's book which 

 might give rise to difference of opinion ; 

 but no one who is imbued with the true 

 scientific spirit can fail to concur most 

 heartily in what he says in his opening 

 chapter as to the " claims of science." 



The first claim of science is founded 

 on the essential difference between sci- 

 entific and unscientific opinion. "The 

 classification of facts," says Prof. Pear- 

 son, "and the formation of absolute 

 judgments upon the basis of this classi- 

 fication judgments independent of the 

 idiosyncrasies of the individual mind 

 is peculiarly the scope and method of 

 modern science. The scientific man has 

 above all tilings to aim at self-elimina- 

 tion in his judgments, to provide an ar- 

 gument which is as true for each individ- 

 ual mind as for his own. . . . The sci- 

 entific method of examining facts is not 

 peculiar to one class of phenomena and 

 to one class of workers ; it is applicable 

 to social as well as to physical problems, 

 and we must carefully guard ourselves 

 against supposing that the scientific 



frame of mind is the peculiarity of the 

 professional scientist." Not only is this 

 method not that of the average man, 

 but its very existence is scarcely sur- 

 mised by him. His method if such 

 it can be called of arriving at conclu- 

 sions is to fasten his attention on a few 

 salient facts, and to interpret them ac- 

 cording to his own prepossessions and 

 interests. If asked to take a point of 

 view from which, perhaps, other facts 

 would become salient, or to divest him- 

 self of self-interest as a canon of inter- 

 pretation, he will in general decline; in 

 many cases, indeed, he will be totally 

 incapable of responding to the invi- 

 tation. The idea of requiring a wide 

 range of facts as a basis for induction, 

 of checking the result of a first survey 

 or examination by that of a second, 

 third, fourth, or tenth, and of treating 

 self-interest or previously formed opin- 

 ion as a disturbing influence from which 

 the judgment is to be kept as free as 

 possible, is one which long ages ot 

 struggle with the problems of Nature 

 have at length bequeathed to the scien- 

 tific workers of to-day, but which has 

 no lodgment, and but slight recognition, 

 in the minds of the multitude. Prof. 

 Pearson is, however, of opinion that an 

 instruction in scientific method might 

 be very generally imparted, and that its 

 effect on the mind of the ensuing gen- 

 eration would be marked. He consid- 

 ers, very rightly, that a scientific frame 

 of mind is an essential of good citizen- 

 ship, seeing that it is that frame of 

 mind alone which leads a man to look 

 beyond proximate phenomena, andabove 

 all to put aside personal bias. It is the 

 peculiarity, as he well observes, of sci- 

 entific method that, when once it has 

 become a habit of mind, that mind con- 

 verts all facts whatsoever into science. 

 Good intentions are not enough to make 



