SUGGESTIBILITY AND KINDRED PHENOMENA. 379 



haps the existence of other active processes prevents its attaining 

 that degree of intensity. Again, if we revert to the old soul 

 theory, now almost wholly abandoned by psychologists, but still, 

 I think, worthy of consideration, we may suppose that the corti- 

 cal process alone can not produce consciousness, but requires the 

 co-operation of some other factor. The pros and cons in these 

 last two suppositions are too intricate for present discussion, and, 

 indeed, my purpose is, not to prove a theory, but to state the 

 fourth supposition and to analyze some of its logical implica- 

 tions. 



The parallel theory would raise the presumption that any 

 cortical process is accompanied by mental phenomena of some 

 kind. We would then assume, in the case under consideration, 

 that the cortical process in the auditory center generated a sound. 

 But how is this to be reconciled to the testimony of consciousness 

 that I heard no sound ? 



Well, it may be that I did hear it, but instantly forgot it, so 

 that my present memory of that period contains no trace of it. 

 That this frequently happens there can be no doubt, but there are 

 many curious phenomena which require a further assumption, 

 and that further assumption may be thus stated : The sound may 

 have existed simply as a solitary sound, all alone, not in my con- 

 sciousness or in the consciousness of any one, but as a bare mental 

 event, related to my consciousness much as a sound in your con- 

 sciousness is related to mine. It is not an easy conception to 

 grasp, for our mental life always consists of many elements, and 

 it would seem that this multiplicity is essentially involved in our 

 notion of consciousness. Yet occasionally we have experiences 

 which help us in forming the conception of a mental state exist- 

 ing outside a personal consciousness. I remember a trifling opera- 

 tion upon the eye which I once underwent. For a few seconds my 

 consciousness seemed reduced to one element a flood of frightful 

 pain, which was not in my eye but seemed to pervade my whole 

 being, to the almost complete exclusion of all else. Again, under 

 nitrous oxide, my consciousness seemed reduced to something so 

 rudimentary as to be wholly indescribable. I have heard of 

 many similar experiences. 



Without pronouncing upon the relative merits of the last two 

 hypotheses I shall develop some of the logical implications of the 

 latter. A state such as I have described, supposed to exist within 

 my head, so to speak, but outside my consciousness, may be de- 

 scribed as subconscious. There are, then, two conceivable ways in 

 which a mental state may vanish from the upper consciousness. 

 The cortical process upon which it depends may die away ; it then 

 perishes absolutely; or the cortical process may be dissociated 

 from the system underlying the total consciousness and yet re- 



