THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM. 591 



phenomena, we pursue always and everywhere the same scientific 

 method. We put like by the side of like, and seek what is com- 

 mon in diversity. In this way is the gradual mastery of the infin- 

 ity of our phenomenal world achieved, and more effective means 

 for compassing the purpose arise in successive development. 

 From bare comparison we pass to system, from this to laws of 

 Nature, and the most comprehensive form of these is compressed 

 into the general principle. We perceive that the phenomena of 

 the actual world, unlimited as is their diversity, still represent 

 only quite definite and well-marked instances of formally conceiv- 

 able possibilities. The significance of the laws of Nature consists 

 in the determination of the real cases out of the possible, and the 

 form to which they may all be traced back is the ascertaining of 

 an invariant, a something which remains unalterable, even when 

 all other criterions within the possible bounds defined by the law 

 change. Thus we see that the historical development of scientific 

 views is always associated with the discover}^ and elaboration of 

 such invariants ; in them are revealed the milestones of the high- 

 way of knowledge which mankind has trodden. 



One such invariant of universal bearing is found in the idea 

 of mass. This not only gives the constants of astronomical laws, 

 but is not less invariably illustrated in the most incisive changes 

 to which we can subject the objects of the outer world chemical 

 processes. For that reason this idea, as being highly adapted to 

 the position, has been made the center of scientific legitimacy. 

 It was, however, in itself too poor in substance to serve for the 

 representation of the manifold phenomena, and had to be corre- 

 spondingly extended. This was done by associating with that 

 simple mechanical idea the series of properties, in their propor- 

 tion, which are experimentally connected with the property of 

 mass. Thus originated the idea of matter, in which was grouped 

 all that was sensibly connected with mass, and continued with it, 

 such as weight, volume, chemical properties, etc., and the physical 

 law of the conservation of mass passed into the metaphysical axiom 

 of the conservation of matter. 



It is important to understand that with this extension a multi- 

 tude of hypothetical elements were introduced into a conception 

 that was in the beginning wholly free from hypotheses. Chem- 

 ical processes, in particular, must be interpreted in the light of 

 this view against the seeming, not as implying a disappearance 

 of the matter affected by the change and its replacement by new 

 matter with new properties. The theory rather became accepted 

 that even when all the sensible properties of, for example, iron 

 and oxygen disappear in iron oxide, iron and oxygen are never- 

 theless present in the resultant substance, and have only taken on 

 other properties. We have now become so accustomed to this view 



