74 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



ticms begotten of the contradictory conclusion should be made the basis 

 of a new inquiry, and if possible of a new working hypothesis. In- 

 stead of the usual assumption of choice, and of the possible alternative 

 of reaching truth or falling into error, let the assumption be that all 

 acts of the mind are parts of a rigorous chain of antecedents and con- 

 sequents. Let it be assumed that no swerving from the predetermined 

 sequences is possible, that every thought and every act follows its 

 antecedents with absolute rigor, no real choice, or volition, or alter- 

 native between accuracy and error being possible. 



Let this set of assumptions be tried as a working hypothesis. If 

 investigation be possible under it, let such investigation cover the 

 whole ground of what we call truth and error. Let a distinction be 

 drawn between absolutely predetermined mental actions corresponding 

 to truthfulness on the one hand, and falsity on the other, if this be pos- 

 sible, and out of the former let science be constructed and let it be 

 shown why it is science, and let the latter be disposed of in some suit- 

 able way. In other words, let the doctrine of determinism be put into 

 workable form, and carried into effect in all its applications, with 

 every step true to the primary assumptions. If this can be done suc- 

 cessfully, we shall have a wholly new working basis for the production 

 of science, with new criteria of science. If it can not be done and the 

 hypothesis of determinism is unworkable, let it be cast aside like any 

 other unworkable hypothesis. Whatever metaphysicians may think of 

 an unworkable scheme, scientific investigators may as well send it to the 

 junk shop. 



Huxley once delivered himself of an able exposition of determin- 

 ism. It was severely criticized by a fellow countryman who seemed to 

 Huxley to have dealt with him unjustly, and he poured out the vials 

 of his rhetorical wrath upon him as only Huxley could. But if de- 

 terminism be true, I do not see how Huxley's critic could have swerved 

 by a turn of a phrase from what he wrote, and Huxley's wrath was not 

 more consistent than that assigned to Xerxes when he lashed the 

 stormy Hellespont because it thwarted his purpose. But in this I may 

 be wholly wrong. Let determinism prove itself by giving rise to a 

 complete and systematic working hypothesis. 



Whether this can be clone or not, let any other basal assumptions 

 suggested by the inquiry be made the ground of like attempts and be 

 developed into full working hypotheses, if possible, and so continue 

 the effort until the whole field is covered. Let it be seen what can and 

 what can not be put into the form of a working system. 



In this second illustration of the method of regenerative hypotheses, 

 I have touched questions not usually thought to belong to the earth- 

 sciences. It is none the less true that they are basal to the earth- 

 sciences, as they are to all science, and to all true philosophy as well. 

 The earth-sciences are entitled to probe for their own bottom as well as 

 other sciences, or any philosophy, and it is altogether wholesome that 



