150 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



a man tells me that I am an imbecile, and then modifies the statement 

 by adding that I am a particular kind of an imbecile, it still rankles 

 in my breast that I am an imbecile; and I am naturally impelled to 

 inquire into the justice of applying the title to me at all. I may not 

 call a young lady a doll, and then soften the blow by explaining that I 

 have somewhat extended the signification of that common word. One 

 has" a right to ask : Is the word, when so extended in meaning, rightly 

 applied at all? Are dolls that think and speak, feel and will, and all 

 the rest, really dolls? If not, why use the word, except as a figure of 

 speech, and with insulting intent? 



Now, it would be absurd to maintain that Huxley or Clifford or any 

 other serious adherent of ' the automaton theory ' has written with the 

 intention of insulting or degrading mankind. These men had a 

 glimpse of what they regarded as a valuable scientific truth, and they 

 urged it upon the attention of their fellows. In doing so, however; 

 they made use of expressions which have actually given offence to 

 many, and have predisposed men to a rejection of their doctrine. I 

 feel like going further and saying that the mere fact that they have 

 seen fit to use such expressions may be taken as an indication that they 

 have not fully grasped the significance of the truth they were endeavor- 

 ing to express, but have themselves slipped into a misconception, which 

 has harmed their cause. 



I may say at the outset that I regard the cause as a good one. This 

 does not in the least mean that I believe in any ' automaton theory/ 

 The name is a grotesque and an offensive one, and should never have 

 been used. The plain man is quite right in refusing to regard him- 

 self as an automaton. The real cause for which the so-called autom- 

 atists, have been fighting is a clear and unambiguous conception of 

 the relation between the mental and the physical — one which will not 

 rub out the distinction between the two, but will do it full justice. In 

 the present paper I shall try to show that the frank acceptance of their 

 fundamental thesis need not make a man an automatist at all; nor 

 need it compel him to modify the estimate which his experience has 

 led him to form of the significance of men's actions. In other words, 

 the man may become as ' scientific ' as he pleases, without on that 

 account being forced to repudiate common sense and common experi- 

 ence. Surely this is no small gain. 



We all have experience of the relations which obtain between mind 

 and body, or we should not even know that we have minds and bodies. 

 But those who have not devoted special attention to psychology and 

 philosophy are apt to have the vaguest of notions as to what the 

 relations in question are. We have, to be sure, gotten beyond the crude 

 materialism that once led men to regard the mind as consisting of five 

 round atoms, disseminated through the body, and inhaled from the 



