IS MAN AN AUTOMATION 153 



be like this, and can play such an important part in his life, he should 

 get over his repugnance to materialism, or at any rate to some sorts 

 of materialism; and he may go on thinking and talking about himself 

 and his neighbors much as he has thought and talked in the past. It 

 is not worth while to be frightened by a mere word; a cold in the 

 head is not made worse when it is given a Latin name. 



It may be said, it is a waste of time to try to protect men against 

 the fear that interactionism may be proved true, for men have no dread 

 of this result, as it is. This I think we must admit. Those who are 

 familiar with the history of psychology and philosophy know that 

 there was a time when it was not repugnant to men to conceive the 

 mind as literally a kind of matter, having its place in the body just 

 as any other kind of matter has its place. Gradually it came to be 

 felt that this was a misconception, and various curious attempts were 

 made to describe the mind as immaterial. To-day nearly every one 

 is willing to say that the mind is immaterial — the conception has be- 

 come common property. Nevertheless, he who is clear-sighted can 

 see that most men have not wholly stripped away materialistic sug- 

 gestions inherited from the past; and he finds these embodied in the 

 interactionist doctrine. As, however, interactionism does not ask the 

 plain man to be more materialistic than he is naturally inclined to 

 be — every one can find a comfortable seat in so roomy a place as a 

 ' somehow ' — it does not arouse his apprehensions. So I shall not 

 spend more time in allaying fears which do not arise in most minds, 

 but shall turn to the ' parallelist ' doctrine. Its supposed terrors con- 

 stitute our proper theme. 



Let us suppose that the parallelist is right. Then ideas and motions 

 in matter must be regarded as belonging to two distinct series, and 

 they must not be made links in the one chain. Thus, a pin is thrust 

 into my leg; I reach down to it and pull it out with my fingers. A 

 series of changes has taken place in my body. Some message has been 

 sent from my leg, along certain nerves, to the brain, and a message has 

 been sent along other nerves to the muscles of my arm and hand. But 

 this does not say everything. I have felt a pain; I have been con- 

 scious of the injury done my leg; I have wished to remove the pin; 

 I have resolved to do so, and am conscious that I do it. The physical 

 series is an unbroken one; the mental phenomena are concomitants 

 of brain changes, but fill no gaps between them. 



Now, if we admit all this, must we sadly accept the following 

 doleful results? 



1. Man must be regarded as an automaton. 



2. Man's mind is insignificant; as his body does all that is to be 

 done, we may say that the result would have been the same had he 

 had no mind. 



