362 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



working value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in 

 the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are 

 good, will depend on their relations to the other truths acknowledged. 



What I said just now about the Absolute of transcendental idealism 

 is a case in point. First, I called it majestic and said it yielded reli- 

 gious comfort to a class of minds, and then I accused it of remoteness 

 and sterility. But so far as it affords such comfort, it surely is not 

 sterile; it has that amount of cash value; it performs a concrete 

 function. As a good pragmatist, I ought myself to call the Absolute 

 true ' in so far forth,' then ; and I unhesitatingly now do so. 



But what does ' true in so far forth,' ' true for so much,' mean in 

 this case? To answer, we need only apply the pragmatic method. 

 What do believers in the Absolute mean by saying that their belief 

 affords them comfort? They mean that since in the Absolute finite 

 evil is ' overruled ' already, we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat 

 the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can 

 trust its outcome, and without sin dismiss our fear and drop the worry 

 of our finite responsibility. In short, they mean that we have a right 

 ever and anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own 

 way, feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none 

 of our immediate business. 



The universe is a system of which the individual members may 

 relax their anxieties occasionally, in which the don't-care mood is also 

 right for men, and moral holidays in order — that, if I mistake not, is 

 part, at least, of what the Absolute is ' known as,' that is the great dif- 

 ference in our particular experiences which his being true makes for us, 

 that is his cash value when he is pragmatically interpreted. Farther 

 than that the ordinary lay-reader in philosophy who thinks favorably 

 of absolute idealism does not venture to sharpen his conceptions. He 

 can use the Absolute for so much, and so much is very precious. He 

 is pained at hearing you speak incredulously of the Absolute, there- 

 fore, and disregards your criticisms because they deal with aspects of 

 the conception that he does not follow. 



If the Absolute means this, and means no more than this, who can 

 possibly deny the truth of it? To deny it would be to insist that men 

 should never relax, and that holidays are never in order. 



I am well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me 

 say that an idea is ' true ' so long as to believe it is profitable to our 

 lives. That it is good, for as much as it profits, you will gladly admit. 

 If what we do by its aid is good, the idea itself is good in so far 

 forth, for we are the better for possessing it. But is it not a strange 

 misuse of the word ' truth ' to call ideas also ' true ' for this reason ? 



To answer this difficulty fully is impossible at this stage of my 

 account. You touch here upon the very central point of Messrs. 



