442 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



PART THIRD. The Objective Value op Science 



Chapter X. Is Science Aetificial? 

 § 1. The Philosophy of M. LeRoy 



There are many reasons for being sceptics; should we push this 

 scepticism to the very end or stop on the way? To go to the end is 

 the most tempting solution, the easiest, and that which many have 

 adopted, despairing of saving anything from the shipwreck. 



Among the writings inspired by this tendency it is proper to place 

 in the first rank those of M. LeRoy. This thinker is not only a 

 philosopher and a writer of the greatest merit, but he has acquired a 

 deep knowledge of the exact and physical sciences, and even has shown 

 rare powers of mathematical invention. Let us recapitulate in a few 

 words his doctrine, which has given rise to numerous discussions. 



Science consists only of conventions, and to this circumstance 

 solely does it owe its apparent certitude; the facts of science and, a 

 fortiori, its laws are the artificial work of the scientist; science there- 

 fore can teach us nothing of the truth; it can only serve us as rule of 

 action. 



Here we recognize the philosophic theory known under the name 

 of nominalism; all is not false in this theory; its legitimate domain 

 must be left it, but out of this it should not be allowed to go. 



This is not all; M. LeRoy's doctrine is not only nominalistic ; it 

 has besides another characteristic which it doubtless owes to M. Berg- 

 son, it is anti-intellectualistic. According to M. LeRoy, the intellect 

 deforms all it touches, and that is still more true of its necessary in- 

 strument ' discourse.' There is reality only in our fugitive and chan- 

 ging impressions, and even this reality, when touched, vanishes. 



And yet M. LeRoy is not a sceptic; if he regards the intellect as 

 incurably powerless, it is only to give more scope to other sources of 

 knowledge, to the heart for instance, to sentiment, to instinct or to 

 faith. 



However great my esteem for M. LeRoy's talent, whatever the 

 ingenuity of this thesis, I can not wholly accept it. Certes, I am in 

 accord on many points with M. LeRoy, and he has even cited, in 

 support of his view, various passages of my writings which I am by 

 no means disposed to reject. I think myself only the more bound to 

 explain why I can not go with him all the way. 



M. LeRoy often complains of being accused of scepticism. He 

 could not help being, though this accusation is probably unjust. Are 

 not appearances against him? Nominalist in doctrine, but realist at 

 heart, he seems to escape absolute nominalism only by a desperate act 

 of faith. 



The fact is that anti-intellectualistic philosophy in rejecting 



