THE VALUE OF SCIENCE 443 



analysis and ' discourse/ just by that condemns itself to being intrans- 

 missible, it is a philosophy essentially internal, or, at the very least, 

 only its negations can be transmitted; what wonder then that for an 

 external observer it takes the shape of scepticism? 



Therein lies the weak point of this philosophy; if it strives to 

 remain faithful to itself, its energy is spent in a negation and a cry of 

 enthusiasm. Each author may repeat this negation and this cry, may 

 vary their form, but without adding anything. 



And yet, would it not be more logical in remaining silent? See, 

 you have written long articles ; for that, it was necessary to use words. 

 And therein have you not been much more * discursive ' and con- 

 sequently much farther from life and truth than the animal who 

 simply lives without philosophizing? Would not this animal be the 

 true philosopher? 



However, because no painter has made a perfect portrait, should we 

 conclude that the best painting is not to paint ? When a zoologist dis- 

 sects an animal, certainly he ' alters it.' Yes, in dissecting it, he con- 

 demns himself to never know all of it; but in not dissecting it, he 

 would condemn himself to never know anything of it and consequently 

 to never see anything of it. 



Certes, in man are other forces besides his intellect, no one has 

 ever been mad enough to deny that. The first comer makes these 

 blind forces act or lets them act; the philosopher must speak of them; 

 to speak of them, he must know of them the little that can be known, 

 he should therefore see them act. How? With what eyes, if not 

 with his intellect? Heart, instinct, may guide it, but not render it 

 useless; they may direct the look, but not replace the eye. It may be 

 granted that the heart is the workman, and the intellect only the 

 instrument. Yet is it an instrument not to be done without, if not for 

 action, at least for philosophizing. Therefore a philosopher really 

 anti-intellectualistic is impossible. Perhaps we shall have to declare 

 for the supremacy of action; always it is our intellect which will thus 

 conclude; in allowing precedence to action it will thus retain the 

 superiority of the thinking reed. This also is a supremacy not to be 

 disdained. 



Pardon these brief reflections and pardon also their brevity, scarcely 

 skimming the question. The process of intellectualism is not the sub- 

 ject I wish to treat: I wish to speak of science, and about it there is 

 no doubt; by definition, so to speak, it will be intellectualistic or it 

 will not be at all. Precisely the question is, whether it will be. 



§ 2. Science, Rule of Action 

 For M. LeRoy, science is only a rule of action. We are powerless 

 to know anything and yet we are launched, we must act, and at all 



