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we speak of as realities. Both appearance and reality are given in 

 sensation, and we observe a connection between them. They belong 

 to the same order of experiences. 



Thus, I may sit in the highest gallery of the opera house, and may 

 say : What looks like a row of small shiny discs in the parquet is really 

 a row of bald heads. Be it remarked that the reality in this case is 

 a something that can unequivocally be located; it is in the parquet, 

 and it occupies space. It can be seen close at hand, and it can be 

 touched with the fingers. May I say that what seems to be a, brain- 

 change in one of these heads really is a sensation of sound? Is the 

 sensation of sound there? does it occupy space? is it literally in the 

 head? 



Evidently we are here again concerned only with 'a, manner of 

 speech' — with a loose expression which cloaks one's ignorance, and 

 which borrows what force it has from a false analogy. If we say 

 that the sensation of sound is the 'reality' and the brain-change the 

 ' appearance,' we abuse two respectable words, in common use, that 

 nave a right to better treatment. 



The truth is that it is better to recognize that mental phenomena 

 must not be conceived after the analogy of material things at all. 

 We may, of course, go on talking about mind and body as other 

 people do. In common life a pedantic exactitude of expression is 

 out of place. But when we try to be scientific we must strip off 

 crude inherited materialisms, the echoes of a remote past. 



The man who has done this the most completely is the parallelist. 

 The limits of this paper prevent me from setting forth his doctrine, 

 but I have elsewhere 3 tried to show simply and clearly just how 

 much he has a right to mean by it. He denies frankly that the mind 

 is in the body, as also that one has the right to hint, by the use of 

 vague and ambiguous material analogies, that it is somehow in the 

 body. It was a philosopher of the seventeenth century who first 

 thought out the doctrine, but it was a scientist of the nineteenth 

 century, Professor W. K. Clifford, who made it popular to us moderns. 

 To him much of the credit for the present revival of the doctrine 

 must be accorded. 



s 'An Introduction to Philosophy,' N. Y., 1906, chapter IX. 



