Mast, L. J. Henderson on "The Fitness of the Environment". 437 



is one, and the biologist may now rightly regard the universe in 

 its very essence as biocentric", if he means to imply by this 

 language, as he seems to, that the properties of the chemical 

 elements (matter) are dependent upon life. It does however show 

 that if fitness of the environment is due solely to adjustment on 

 the part of the organism adaptation is even more nearly perfect 

 than had been suspected. 



The author admits that "existing knowledge provides no" ex- 

 planation of the fitness of the environment. He says (p. 276), 

 "There is, in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions 

 that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, 

 and especially of their stable compounds water and carbonic acid, 

 which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should 

 simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through 

 the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them to- 

 gether. There is no greater probability that these unique properties 

 should be without due cause uniquely favorable to the organic 

 mechanism. These are no mere accidents, an explanation is to 

 seek. It must be admitted, however, that no explanation is at 

 hand/' Ideology and vitalism, he maintains, do not help us. But he 

 admits (p. 280) that "biological science has not been able to escape the 

 recognition of a natural formative tendency", and holds that fitness 

 of the environment also results from a "tendency, a bent, a direc- 

 tion of flow or development". This strikes the reviewer as being 

 strongly charged with teleology, but Henderson says (p. 279), 

 "ordinary teleology is dangerous doctrine is science", and he proceeds 

 to annihilate it together with vitalists, another precarious doctrine. 



He contends that those who postulate an "extraphysical 

 influence" to account for adaptation in the organic must make the 

 same postulation to account for fitness in the inorganic. But this 

 reduces both to the same level and does away with vitalism. He 

 says (p. 299), "The two fitnesses are complementary; are they then 

 single or dual in origin? The simple view would be to imagine 

 one common impetus operating upon all matter, inorganic and 

 organic, through all stages of its evolution, in all its states and 

 forms, and leading to worlds like our own through paths apparently 

 purposeful and really not explained. Such, it seems to me, is the 

 natural hypothesis for the vitalist to adopt. But then vitalism 

 vanishes; only teleology remains, for the unique characteristic of 

 life is gone". How r ever if teleology is at work at all in the 

 inorganic it is at work at the very "basis of physical science . . . 

 Yet it is certain that physical science needs no teleology to explain 

 its phenomena and processes" (p. 301). "If, then", he continues 

 (p. 305), "cosmic evolution be pure mechanism and yet issue in 

 fitness, why not organic evolution as well? Mechanism is enough 



