LETTERS ON THE LAND QUESTION 341 



Now, my friends and myself, having no better guides than 

 common morality and common sense, are of opinion that, suppos- 

 ing Ivanhoe to have behaved in this scandalous fashion, the fact 

 makes not the smallest difference in justice or in equity to the title 

 of A. B. ; and that, if it did, the State, which has contracted to de- 

 fend A. B.'s title without the least reference to such antiquarian 

 contingencies, would commit a gross fraud if it broke its contract 

 on any such flimsy pretenses. 



The right to compensation is not in question ; what we deny is 

 the right to disturb A. B. on such a ground. 



It would appear, however, that there is some better guidance 

 than that of common morality and common sense ; " absolute po- 

 litical ethics " is an infallible indicator of what we ought to do 

 whether the action indicated is possible or impossible. 



Now, what we want is this very light as to what we ought to 

 do in such a concrete case as that I have mentioned. The dictum 

 that " ownership established by force does not stand on the same 

 footing as ownership established by contract," I must repeat, 

 " does not help us." Construed strictly, it is a mere truism ; con- 

 strued broadly, it may cover Mr. Laidler's view. 



What we want to know is this : According to " absolute political 

 ethics," has A. B. a moral as well as a legal right to his land or not ? 



If he has not, how does " absolute political ethics " deduce his 

 title to compensation ? And, if he has, how does " absolute politi- 

 cal ethics " deduce the State's right to disturb him ? 



No question is raised here as to the right of the State to deal 

 with A. B.'s land or anything else he possesses on grounds of 

 public utility or necessity ; nor do we want to know what may be 

 done by the wisdom or the folly of future generations. " Abso- 

 lute political ethics" should be independent of time and space; 

 and it ought to be able to tell us whether, in foro conscientiw, 

 A. B., if he continue to hold his land under the circumstances sup- 

 posed, is an honest man or a receiver of stolen goods. 



I intervene in this discussion most unwillingly, but I have 

 long been of opinion that the great political evil of our time is the 

 attempt to sanction popular acts of injustice by antiquarian and 

 speculative arguments. 



My friend Mr. Spencer is, I am sure, the last person willingly 

 to abet this tendency. But I am afraid that, in spite of all Mr. 

 Spencer's disclaimers, the next time Mr. Morley visits his constitu- 

 ents his pertinacious "heckler" will insist that, after all, the 

 younger and the older philosopher are not disagreed in principle ; 

 and that the difference of " footing " between ownership primarily 

 based on force and other ownership can not be cured by efflux of 

 time, and justifies the State now, or at any future period, in deal- 

 ing differently with the two. 



