ABSOLUTE POLITICAL ETHICS. 615 



be to pooh-pooh arithmetic because of blunders in certain arith- 

 metical calculations. 



I turn now to a question above put whether, by absolute 

 political ethics, nothing more is meant than an ethical warrant 

 for systems of law a question to which, by implication, I an- 

 swered No. And now I have to answer that it extends over a 

 further field equally wide if less important. For beyond the rela- 

 tions among citizens taken individually, there are the relations 

 between the incorporated body of citizens and each citizen. And 

 on these relations between the State and the man, absolute politi- 

 cal ethics gives judgments as well as on the relations between 

 man and man. Its judgments on the relations between man and 

 man are corollaries from its primary truth, that the activities of 

 each in pursuing the objects of life may be rightly restricted only 

 by the like activities of others : such others being like-natured 

 (for the principle does not contemplate slave-societies or societies 

 in which one race dominates over another) ; and its judgments 

 on the relations between the man and the State are corollaries 

 from the allied truth, that the activities of each citizen may be 

 rightly limited by the incorporated body of citizens only as far 

 as is needful for securing to him the remainder. This further 

 limitation is a necessary accompaniment of the militant state; 

 and must continue so long as, besides the criminalities of indi- 

 vidual aggression, there continue the criminalities of international 

 aggression. It is clear that the preservation of the society is an 

 end which must take precedence of the preservation of its indi- 

 viduals taken singly; since the preservation of each individual 

 and maintenance of his ability to pursue the objects of life, de- 

 pend on the preservation of the society. Such restrictions upon 

 his actions as are imposed by the necessities of war, and of pre- 

 paredness for war when it is probable, are therefore ethically de- 

 fensible. 



And here we enter upon the many and involved questions 

 with which relative political ethics has to deal. When originally 

 indicating the contrast, I spoke of " absolute political ethics, or 

 that which ought to be, as distinguished from relative political 

 ethics, or that which is at present the nearest practicable approach 

 to it " ; and had any ' attention been paid to this distinction, no 

 controversy need have arisen. Here I have to add that the quali- 

 fications which relative political ethics sets forth vary with the 

 type of the society, which is primarily determined by the extent 

 to which defense against other societies is needful. Where inter- 

 national enmity is great and the social organization has to be 

 adapted to warlike activities, the coercion of individuals by the 

 State is such as almost to destroy their freedom of action and 



