616 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



make them slaves of the State ; and where this results from the 

 necessities of defensive war (not offensive war, however), relative 

 political ethics furnishes a warrant. Conversely, as militancy 

 decreases, there is a diminished need both for that subordination 

 of the individuals which is necessitated by consolidating them 

 into a fighting machine, and for that further subordination en- 

 tailed by supplying this fighting machine with the necessaries of 

 life ; and as fast as this change goes on, the warrant for State - 

 coercion which relative political ethics furnishes becomes less 

 and less. 



Obviously it is out of the question here to enter upon the com- 

 plex questions raised. It must suffice to indicate them as above. 

 Should I be able to complete Part IV of the "Principles of 

 Ethics" treating of "Justice," of which the first chapters only 

 are at present written, I hope to deal adequately with these rela- 

 tions between the ethics of the progressive condition and the 

 ethics of that condition which is the goal of progress a goal ever 

 to be recognized, though it can not be actually reached. 



The grave misrepresentations dealt with in the foregoing sec- 

 tions, I have been able to rectify by an exposition that is mainly 

 impersonal : allusions, only, having been made to the personal 

 bearings of the argument. But there remain other grave misrep- 

 resentations which I can not dispose of in the same way. Life 

 sometimes presents alternatives both of which are disagreeable, 

 and acceptance of either of which is damaging. A choice between 

 two such I now find myself compelled to make. Prof. Huxley, 

 referring to me, speaks of "the gulf fixed between his way of 

 thinking and mine " : the implication being that as he regards his 

 own " way of thinking " as the right one, my way of thinking, 

 separated from it by a gulf, must be extremely wrong. As this 

 tacit condemnation of my " way of thinking " touches not only 

 the question at issue but also many other questions, and as it 

 comes not from an anonymous critic, but from one whose state- 

 ments will be taken as trustworthy, I am placed in the dilemma 

 of either passively allowing his injurious characterization, or else 

 of showing that it is untrue, which I can not do without describ- 

 ing or illustrating my " way of thinking." This is, of course, an 

 unpleasant undertaking, and one which self-respect would ordi- 

 narily negative. But unpleasant as it is, I feel obliged to enter 

 upon it. 



Years ago Prof. Huxley criticised the political doctrine held 

 by me, and entitled his article " Administrative Nihilism." As 

 this doctrine includes advocacy of governmental action for the 

 repression not only of crimes but of many minor offenses, I pointed 

 out that if it is to be called " administrative nihilism," then still 



