73 8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



to morals. And yet it must be considered doubtful whether, by 

 the authority of ministers of religion or by the experience of the 

 individual conscience, religion has ever originated an ethical 

 principle. We have seen above that the hypothesis of a super- 

 natural divine revelation is not necessary in order to explain the 

 existence of our ethical principles and practices. We have also 

 seen further that these principles and practices have their origin 

 in general not in man's feeling toward the divine, but in his inter- 

 course with his fellow-creatures. There seems to be no rule of 

 ethical usage among us that does not finally go back to our view 

 of its bearing on the well-being of society. This last is the final 

 standard by which we test all our arguments on moral questions. 

 If we wish to decide on the desirableness of flogging on board 

 ships, we ask whether it maintains discipline better than any 

 other punishment, and how it affects the character of the sailor, it 

 being assumed that the proper development of the individual is 

 an essential element of social progress. In the same way we treat 

 all disciplinary problems capital punishment, solitary confine- 

 ment, corporal chastisement by parents and teachers : we inquire 

 into the effect on the individual, but the individual as a member 

 of society. We recognize individual rights, but we do not hesitate 

 to sacrifice them to the welfare of the whole. No sympathy with 

 a culprit affects us if we believe that the good of the community 

 requires his punishment. An argument which demonstrates the 

 best social good is considered final. In the prohibition contro- 

 versies the only point really considered by the disputants is, Does 

 prohibition prohibit ? Is war lawful ? The answer is given by 

 appeal to the necessities of national life. 



But how is it with cases of priestly legislation ? Are they not 

 contributions of religion to ethics ? In all such cases I believe it 

 will be found that the ethical principle involved is one which has 

 already been established by society and is only applied by re- 

 ligion. As an example let us take the institution of taboo, whose 

 usages are so widely spread in civilized as well as uncivilized 

 countries. Taboo sets certain things apart as sacred or as the 

 special property of gods or men, not to be owned or used by 

 others. Obviously an ethical principle enters here, since the use of 

 tabooed objects by the community becomes wrong ; and, as taboo 

 is an essentially religious idea, it may be said that religion has 

 here established a moral rule. But let us see whether this is 

 really the case. The customs of taboo are of two sorts, those 

 which relate to the gods and to persons and places consecrated to 

 their worship, and those which relate to ordinary social inter- 

 course. 



The reverence required for images of deities, for sacred build- 

 ings and their furniture and ministers, is of course a purely re- 



