ON THE NATURAL INEQUALITY OF MEN. 767 



themselves as were the animals of each species before various physical causes had 

 produced, in some of them, the varieties which we observe. In fact, it is not con- 

 ceivable that these first changes, by whatever means they were brought about, 

 altered, at once and in the same way, all the individuals of a species ; but some 

 having become improved or deteriorated, and having acquired different qualities, 

 good or bad, which were not inherent in their nature, the others remained longer 

 in their original state ; and such was the first source of inequality among men, 

 which is more easy to prove thus, in a general way, than to assign exactly to its 

 true causes. (" Discours," preface.) 



In accordance with this conception of the origin of inequality 

 among men, Rousseau distinguishes, at the outset of the "Dis- 

 cours/' two kinds of inequality : 



the one which I term natural, or physical, because it is established by nature, and 

 which consists in the differences of age, health, bodily strength, and intellectual 

 or spiritual qualities; the other, which may be called moral, or political, because 

 it depends on a sort of convention, and is established, or at least authorized, by 

 the consent of mankind. This last inequality consists in the different privileges 

 which some enjoy, to the prejudice of others, as being richer, more honored, more 

 powerful than they, or by making themselves obeyed by others. 



Of course the question readily suggests itself : Before drawing 

 this sharp line of demarkation between natural and political in- 

 equality, might it not be as well to inquire whether they are not 

 intimately connected, in such a manner that the latter is essen- 

 tially a consequence of the former ? This question is indeed put 

 by Rousseau himself. And, as the only answer he has to give is 

 a piece of silly and insincere rhetoric about its being a question 

 fit only for slaves to discuss in presence of their masters, we may 

 fairly conclude that he knew well enough he dare not grapple 

 with it. The only safe course for him was to go by on the other 

 side and as far as the breadth of the road would permit ; and, in 

 the rest of his writings, to play fast and loose with the two senses 

 of inequality, as convenience might dictate. 



With these preliminary remarks kept well in view, we may 

 proceed to the discussion of those fundamental theses of the " Dis- 

 course " and of the " Social Contract " which Rousseau calls the 

 " principes du droit politique." Rousseau defines his object thus: 



Je veux chercher si dans l'ordre civil il peut y avoir quelque regie d'administra- 

 tion legitime et sure, en prenant les hommes tels qu'ils sont et les lois tels qu'elles 

 peuvent etre. Je tacherai d'allier toujours dans cette recherche ce que le droit 

 permet avec ce que l'interet present, afin que la justice et l'utilite ne se trouvent 

 point divis6es.* (I seek to know if there may be in the civil order any legitimate 

 and sure rule of civil administration, taking men as they are and laws as they 

 might be. I shall try to combine in this research what the law permits with what 

 interest prescribes, so that justice and utility shall not find themselves divided.) 



* " Contrat Social," livre 1". Compare Hobbes's dedication of " Human Nature " written 

 in 1640: "They who have written of justice and policy in general do all invade each other 



