ON THE NATURAL INEQUALITY OF MEN. 77s 



Rousseau's first and second great doctrines having thus col- 

 lapsed, what is to be said to the third ? 



Of course, if there are no rights of property but those based on 

 contract, conquest, that is to say, taking possession by force, of 

 itself can confer no right. But, as the doctrine that there are no 

 rights of property but those based on the consent of the whole hu- 

 man race that is, that A. B. can not own anything unless the 

 whole of mankind formally signify their assent to his ownership 

 turns out to be more than doubtful in theory and decidedly incon- 

 venient in practice, we may inquire if there is any better reason 

 for the assertion that force can confer no right of ownership. 

 Suppose that, in the old seafaring days, a pirate attacked an East 

 Indiaman got soundly beaten and had to surrender. When the 

 pirates had walked the plank or been hanged, had the captain and 

 crew of the East Indiaman no right of property in the prize I 

 am not speaking of mere legal right, but ethically ? But if they 

 had, what is the difference when nations attack one another ; 

 when there is no way out of their quarrel but the appeal to force, 

 and the one that gets the better seizes more or less of the other's 

 territory and demands it as the price of peace ? In the latter 

 case, in fact, we have a contract, a price paid for an article to 

 wit, peace delivered, and certain lands taken in exchange ; and 

 there can be no question that the buyer's title is based on con- 

 tract. Even in the former alternative, I see little difference. 

 When they declared war, the parties knew very well that they 

 referred their case to the arbitrament of force ; and if contracts 

 are eternally valid, they are fully bound to abide by the decision 

 of the arbitrator whom they have elected to obey. Therefore, 

 even on Hobbes's or Rousseau's principles, it is not by any means 

 clear to my mind that force, or rather the state of express or tacit 

 contract which follows upon force successfully applied, may not 

 be plausibly considered to confer ownership. 



But if the question is argued, as I think it ought to be, on em- 

 pirical grounds if the real question is not one of imagined a 

 priori principle, but of practical expediency of the conduct 

 which conduces most to human welfare then it appears to me 

 that there is much to be said for the opinion that force effectually 

 and thoroughly used, so as to render further opposition hopeless, 

 establishes an ownership * which should be recognized as soon as 

 possible. I am greatly disposed to think, that when ownership 

 established by force has endured for many generations, and all 

 sorts of contracts have been entered into on the faith of such 

 ownership, the attempt to disturb it is very much to be deprecated 

 on all grounds. For the welfare of society, as for that of individual 



* Submission to the Revolution of 1688 by Jacobites could be advocated ethically on no 

 other ground, though all sorts of pretexts were invented to disguise the fact. 



