THE llf STORY OF SCIENCE 319 



hands of the historian of science. In this matter the historian of 

 science may he of great assistance to the psychologists among whom the 

 discussions are being carried on ; since, because of the analogy of the 

 individual and the nation, the origin of a problem in the one may throw 

 light on the similar process in the other. 



This may be illustrated by numerous examples. Thus, some psy- 

 chologists claim that the problems of science grow out of the practical 

 needs of social and economic life. For example, to the primitive man 

 the problem of catching the fish becomes real and definite because of 

 his hunger. In like manner, the problem of the steam engine devel- 

 oped only after there was urgent need of such a machine for mining 

 purposes; and the problem of the electric telegraph was defined by a 

 marked social demand for a quick method of sending messages. The 

 modern inventor finds the impulse to invention in his hope of gaining 

 material reward for a more efficient machine, etc. But while this ex- 

 planation of the origin of problems may do for those that fall within 

 the realm of applied science, some think that it is not so useful when 

 applied to the problems of pure science, like that of the motions of the 

 solar system, the phenomena of universal gravitation, etc. 



In order to account for the origin of this latter type of problem, it 

 has been claimed that the prime factor in the definition of the problems 

 that go to make up science is not to be found in the practical or con- 

 crete external situation, but rather in some internal ideal or desire or 

 feeling with which an individual becomes inspired, he knows not how 

 or whence. According to this view, an individual may notice an ex- 

 ternal phenomenon over and over again without its defining in him a 

 problem. It is only when he notices in the phenomenon two or more 

 factors that do not seem to him to be in harmony — not to accord with 

 some cherished or imagined ideal — that a state of curiosity or of mental 

 tension is induced ; and when this condition is reached, he has a prob- 

 lem defined within him, which, if he have any real scientific spirit, does 

 not suffer him to rest until his curiosity is satisfied or his mental ten- 

 sion eased. When this latter state is reached, he is said to have found 

 an " explanation," and the problem is for him solved. 



These statements are, of course, but the crudest possible descriptions 

 of but two of the points of view from which the origin of problems has 

 been approached. It will require considerable discussion and study 

 before the whole matter will be cleared up in a tolerably satisfactory 

 manner. But even though the question is far from settled, two impor- 

 tant conclusions follow at once from either or both of the points of 

 view just outlined. The first is this: Science is not the source of the 

 progress of civilization. It is rather the faithful handmaid who helps 

 us truly to satisfy the practical needs of society as they become mani- 

 fest, and to achieve the purposes, ideals, or whatever they are, that 



