"PHYSIOLOGICAL" PSYCHOLOGY 49 1 



to one another, and that for the explanation of their inner coherence and inter- 

 action no artificial hypotheses are requisite. 19 



Evidently, then, psychology investigates all that we apprehend 

 through internal perception. If we apprehend anything by external 

 perception, it must submit to transmutation by the " inner," in order to 

 enter into experience as an effective component. I am unable to see 

 that any other meaning can be read into this view than that formulated 

 in the current theory of psycho-physical parallelism. Causal con- 

 nection between body and mind there is none ; and the contrasts in our 

 inner experience of them reside in apprehension, never in actual reality. 

 The plain business of psychology, therefore, consists in applying ob- 

 servation, experiment and hypothesis to the " inner." Just as with 

 science, regressive analysis supplies the methods. 



Beneke concludes that psychological processes present themselves as 

 complexes fashioned from four primary factors. These are: (1) The 

 transmutation of sense "excitations"; (2) the formation of new 

 " powers " — analogous, it may be said, to the growth of new tissue ; 

 (3) the redistribution of "excitations" (sensuous) and of these new 

 "powers" or products themselves; (4) the interpenetratation of homo- 

 geneous products, according to their degree of homogeneity. Obviously 

 enough, redistribution, or transference, within the psychological com- 

 plex forms the dominant feature; and its forcible similarity to modern 

 energistic conceptions or, as Professor Titchener remarks acutely, " to 

 the process by which one body becomes cooler by communicating heat to 

 another," 20 needs no comment. Whatever one may think of Beneke's 

 special doctrines, he stands to his material in the attitude of a positive 

 scientific investigator. If Herbart worked like a mathematical phys- 

 icist, Beneke works like a biologist. Indeed, he reminds one of the 

 French school of so-called " organicists " — Bichat, Claude Bernard. 

 Delage and, perhaps, Eoux. I think a specious case could be framed 

 for a parallelism between Beneke's teaching and Claude Bernard's 

 biological conclusion, especially as formulated in the second Lecon in 

 the first volume of his " Lecons sur les Phenomenes de la Vie " (1874), 

 which contains the striking declaration : " la fixite du milieu interieur 

 est la condition de la vie libre independante." 21 Be this as it may. 

 Beneke brought psychology within the purview of scientific inquiry. 

 Like Herbart's, his conclusions might be stigmatized, but that both 

 made preparatory contributions there can be no reasonable doubt. The 

 attitude they adopted is of the essence of the matter. And one ought 

 to add that the presence of unconscious or subconscious factors in the 

 physical process, a highly significant phenomenon, follows from the 

 situation as contemplated by them. 



""Lehrbuch d. Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft " (1845), Sect. 48. 

 20 Mind, Vol. XIV., pp. 21-2 (old series). 

 -'P. 113. 



