PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 135 



THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS "PHYSIOLOGICAL" 

 PSYCHOLOGY. Ill 



By Professor R. M. VVENLEY 



UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 



LOTZE'S (1817-81) career as an author opened in 1841, and his 

 psychological contributions relevant to the present theme came 

 to an end practically in 1852. Thereafter, save for a few articles, 1 he 

 devoted himself to the elaboration of his highly significant philosoph- 

 ical system. He therefore antedated the work of Helmholtz. A 

 prominent figure in the bitter controversy over vitalism and material- 

 ism (1817-60), he suffered grave misunderstanding; nevertheless, 

 thanks to lapse of time, his psychological position admits of no doubt. 



The son of a physician, Lotze entered the University of Leipzig to 

 prepare for the paternal profession. Under the influence of Weisse he 

 became interested in philosophy, and, upon graduation, qualified as 

 Docent in both the medical and philosophical faculties. Till 1852 the 

 studies proper to the former predominated, philosophy claimed him 

 later, and his system represents more symptomatically than any other 

 the stress resultant upon the cross-currents of modern thought. It is 

 meaningful that he occupied successively Herbart's chair at Gottingen 

 and Hegel's at Berlin. 



In 1842 he took a decided stand, or even lead, in the vitalist con- 

 troversy, 2 and also published his " General Pathology and Therapeutics 

 as Mechanical Sciences." His " General Physiology of the Corporeal 

 Life " appeared in 1851 and, in the next year, the work of importance 

 for us now — " Medical Psychology, or Physiology of the Soul." Viewed 

 in the perspective of cultural development, especially in Germany, his 

 position seems to me quite evident. Here is his own statement of it: 



We have two kinds of scientific knowledge. We know, on the one hand, 

 nature, the essence of the object studied; on the other hand, we know only the 

 external relations that are possible between it and other objects. In the first 

 kind of knowledge, there is a possible question of a cognitio rei only when our 

 intelligence apprehends an object, not simply under the form of external being, 

 but in an intuition so immediate that we are able, by our senses and ideas, to 



1 Cf. " Formation de la notion d'espace " in Revue Philosophique, Vol. IV., 

 pp. 345 ff . ; appendix to Stumpf's " Ueber den psychologischen Ursprung d. 

 Raumvorstellung " (1873); " Metaphysik," Bk. II., Chap. IV.; " Grundzuge d. 

 Psychologie " ( posthumous ) . 



2 Leben u. Lebenskraft, in Wagner's " Handworterbuch," 1842. 



