2 3 o POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



primary feeling of activity; (4) the reflex effect of these strain sensa- 

 tions, intensifying the idea apperceived." 8 Despite this complexity, 

 the apperceptive theory posits fundamentally a necessary " original 

 activity," or " psychical energy," which arises from within conscious- 

 ness and transforms, as by a synthesis, what, for convenience sake, may 

 be termed simple factors. Physiological stimulus pales, and subjective 

 transitiveness becomes determining. This activity has close connection 

 with will, often with choice. How can it be explained? With Wundt 

 the term consciousness possesses a special and restricted meaning. It 

 consists of all contents, such as feelings, ideas, excitations of the will, 

 and — there is no underlying substance or occult being. This represents 

 the analytic aspect; the synthetic remains to be reckoned with. Now, 

 the spontaneous activity of the mind itself, whereby presentations come 

 to be distinguished clearly, appears as appercipient attention, when 

 brought to play upon perceptions or upon the " stream of conscious- 

 ness," and as volition, when it originates movements of the body. 

 Obviously, the former is the more fundamental, because, in it, I connect 

 my ideas with my will. It " depends, on the one hand, upon the 

 stimuli then at work; and, on the other hand, upon the total state of 

 consciousness, bow it is made up that is, by present impressions and 

 prior experiences. ... If we would describe more nearly what it is 

 that we experience in ourselves when pleased or pained we can not do 

 this more concretely than by denoting pleasure as a straining after, 

 and pain as a straining against, an object." 9 We may say, then, that 

 apperception means will brought to bear upon states of consciousness 

 and then directed to external muscular acts. For, " there is absolutely 

 nothing outside man or in him which we can call wholly or entirely 

 his own except his will." 10 So Wundt finds the existence of a synthetic 

 activity of consciousness beyond the range of mere association. With- 

 out going far wrong, we might term this the single faculty into which 

 all the faculties of the old psychology are absorbed. For it compares 

 and selects among conscious states ; or peraclventure, it can be described 

 as a species of conscious striving. Here, then, the mental unity pre- 

 sents its distinctive, differentiating nature, and, as some have indeed 

 supposed, might be held exempt from the persistent sapping of psycho- 

 physiological method, secluding itself within its unattainable citadel. 

 But this is a complete mistake; and I take the opportunity to call 

 attention to Wundt's modern position even here, a pronouncement the 

 more necessary that he has been so frequently misunderstood, strangely 

 enough, by those who ought to know better. Apperception, or what 

 you please, happens to be an undoubted fact of mental life. Accord- 



8 



Am. Journal of Psych., Vol. VIII., part 3. 

 "Physiol. Psych.," p. 535, Vol. I. (3d ed.) 

 " System d. Phil.," p. 387. 



