THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGNS. 159 



The other approach lay along the river valley and across Sand 

 Mountain. The advantage of this route was that the army was near 

 its base of supplies, with which it had both river and railroad connec- 

 tion. However, the roads were poor and the route lay across parallel 

 ridges, almost inaccessible except in a few places. It would be hard 

 to maintain a compact advance over the rough country, and a regiment 

 of the enemy could easily delay an army. Eosecrans chose this route 

 and the manner in which he maneuvered his army was certainly a bril- 

 liant piece of strategy. 



Bragg had expected the federal army to come over Walden's Eidge, 

 and Eosecrans did all in his power to strengthen that belief. Troops 

 were deployed in front of Chattanooga and at night camp fires were 

 lighted on the hills above the river. By feinting in this way Eosecrans 

 was able to advance his army into Lookout Valley without encounter- 

 ing opposition. From here he went through the passes of Lookout 

 Mountain into Chattanooga Valley and threatened Bragg 's line of 

 communication with the south. Bragg led his army out and, after a 

 series of maneuvers, the battle of Chickamauga was fought with dis- 

 astrous results to the federals. Had it not been for the stand made 

 by Thomas, the 'Eock of Chickamauga,' the union army would have 

 been routed. As it was, they were driven into Chattanooga and im- 

 prisoned by a seemingly impregnable line of works. Lookout Moun- 

 tain was abandoned and at once occupied by the confederates. It was 

 apparently the key to the situation. 



Eosecrans had caught the wolf by the ears. He had gained Chat- 

 tanooga, but was a prisoner in its outworks. To advance against the 

 strongly entrenched enemy was folly. To retreat across the plateau 

 would have demoralized his army besides losing the position he had 

 won at such cost. Worst of all, the enemy had taken possession of 

 Lookout Mountain, which Eosecrans had felt obliged to abandon. 

 They had fortified the position and placed guns which commanded 

 the river and railroad west of Chattanooga, thus cutting oft' supplies 

 from that direction. For awhile provisions came over the Cumber- 

 land plateau, but the hardships of the route soon exhausted the teams 

 which could not follow the river, as that was patrolled by the enemy's 

 pickets and were obliged to take circuitous roads over the hills and 

 away from the river. The cattle that were driven that way were 

 hardly able to stand alone, much less furnish sustenance. The soldiers 

 with grim humor spoke of them as 'dried beef on the hoof.' Bragg, 

 confident of his game, sat down and waited for the union army to be 

 starved into surrendering, and his hopes did not seem unreasonable. 



The north was thoroughly alarmed at this state of affairs and Grani 

 was put in command. His first work was to open a line by which 

 supplies could reach the city. The celerity with which he accomplished 

 this makes one wonder whv it was not done before. The onlv' feasible 



