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TEE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



the previous speakers except two, Mr. Frederic 

 Harrison and Prof. Clifford, believe, for different 

 reasons, and in different degrees, that such a 

 decline in such a belief in God would probably 

 result in a parallel decline in human morality ; 

 though some insist most, like Sir James Stephen 

 and Prof. Huxley, on the point that any attempt 

 to bolster up the belief artificially for the sake 

 of its moral consequences, by discountenancing 

 free discussion, would result in a worse decline 

 of morality, and others insist most, like Dr. Mar- 

 tineau, Lord Selborne, and Dean Church, on the 

 point that the same causes which result in a de- 

 cline in this belief (especially as it is represented 

 in Christianity) are likely to result also in a de- 

 cline in the force of the ethical principles so 

 closely associated with it. But I do not under- 

 stand any one to differ with Prof. Huxley, that if 

 the belief can be shown to be false, be the moral 

 consequence what it may, it ought to go. On the 

 other hand, I understand both Mr. Harrison and 

 Prof. Clifford to assert that the causes which, as 

 they think, have undermined and are undermin- 

 ing the belief in a righteous God, external to the 

 human race, have no tendency to undermine the 

 binding power of the highest human ethics, but, 

 on the contrary, have a direct tendency to elevate 

 and refine them, though Prof. Clifford regards 

 this tendency as, on the whole, slight, and con- 

 fined chiefly to the blow which such a change in 

 belief will have in diminishing the control of the 

 clergy, while Mr. Harrison expects very much 

 indeed from it, if only through its tendency to 

 concentrate on the desirable aims of a real world, 

 an enthusiasm now so much dissipated in his 

 opinion, by lavishing it on imaginary objects. 



Now, while I heartily admit with Prof. Hux- 

 ley the conceivability that a gross delusion — like 

 the belief that " every socially immoral act would 

 instantly be followed by three months' severe 

 toothache" — if it could be palmed off successfully 

 upon our race, would have some very beneficial 

 consequences — (some also by no means beneficial) 

 — and should not a bit the less regard a conspir- 

 acy, even if one were practicable, to impose such 

 a delusion on our race, as a great sin, I cannot 

 the more on that account see how to disentangle 

 the question whether there be a righteous God 

 external to men from the question whether there 

 would be a great moral loss to human nature 

 in the dissipation of the belief in such a God. 

 It is quite conceivable — nay, it has often hap- 

 pened — that a sincere delusion has produced the 

 best results. The belief in an imaginary danger 

 of death, for instance, has often made a man 



take life more seriously ; and the belief in an 

 imaginary danger of invasion has probably often 

 bound a divided nation together and given it a 

 greater nervous strength and manliness. But 

 though it is easy to conceive a belief, in some 

 respects beneficial, which is wholly false, it seems 

 to me, in the case before us, that the very ele- 

 ment in the belief we are discussing, which makes 

 it beneficial, is also a clear note of its truth. 

 What makes the belief in such a God as I have 

 spoken of beneficial is that this belief, and this 

 only, gives to the attitude of man's mind, in rela- 

 tion to right motive and right action, that mixt- 

 ure of courage and cheerful irresponsibility for 

 the result characteristic of a faith. Luther's 

 great saying, " We say to our Lord God that if 

 he will have his Church, he must uphold it, fov 

 we cannot uphold it, and, even if we could, we 

 should become the proudest asses under heaven," 1 

 would be of course simply untranslatable into 

 any humanist or positivist dialect at all. I do 

 not indeed quite know what Mr. Harrison means 

 when he talks of a "frankly human" religion 

 which shall provide us with a " Providence " 

 whom we are " to love and serve ; " but I sup- 

 pose he must mean that we are to love that law 

 of the universe which produces a certain amount 

 of correspondence between our nature and its 

 " environment," and that we are to cooperate 

 with that law. At least this is the only meaning 

 I am able to attach to "loving and serving" a 

 Providence without believing in God. Now for 

 myself I am incapable of loving a mere law of 

 any kind, whether it be a law of gravitation, a 

 law of assimilation between my organism and its 

 environment, or any other ; and as for " serving " 

 it, I like to judge for myself, and, instead of 

 allowing myself always to be assimilated to my 

 " environment," I sometimes prefer what is called, 

 in the language of the same philosophy, " dif- 

 ferentiating " myself from it. But I think even 

 Mr. Harrison would hardly justify language of 

 trust like Luther's, toward a " Being " of whom 

 we are supposed to know nothing except that it 

 has given rise to the earth we live on, and will 

 most likely, in a few thousand years, also put a 

 final end to it. You cannot trust a being of 

 whose purposes, or capacity for having purposes, 

 you know nothing, because trust implies approv- 

 ing those purposes and believing them to be ac- 

 companied by a far higher range of knowledge 

 and foresight than your own. Yet has not all the 

 benefit of trust in God arisen from that humility 



i " Tischi-eden," edition Furstemaira, Leipsic, 1S44, 

 vol. ii., p. 830. 



