EI CU A ED WA GXEE. 



133 



will see that its principal object was to assert the 

 proposition with which it concludes, which is in 

 these words : 



" This [i. c, the whole of the preceding argu- 

 ment] shows that the support which an existing 

 creed gives to an existing system of morals is 

 irrelevant to its truth, and that the question 

 whether a given system of morals is good or bad 

 cannot be fully determined until after the deter- 

 mination of the question whether the theology on 

 ■which it rests is true or false. The morality is [I 

 should have said " may be "] good if it is founded 

 on a true estimate of the consequences of human 

 actions. But if it is founded on a false theology 

 it is founded on a false estimate of the conse- 

 quences of human actions ; and, so far as that is 

 the case, it cannot be good ; and the circumstance 

 that it is supported by the theology to which it 

 refers is an argument against, and not in favor of, 

 that theology." 



The only "question" which my paper was 

 intended to raise is the question whether that 

 proposition is true or not ? I do not see how its 

 truth can depend (as the Dean of St. Paul's sug- 

 gests) upon further particulars as to " what 

 morality is influenced," or " what theology is 

 declining." I said nothing about the decline of 

 any particular theological belief, or its influence 

 on any particular system of morals. My prop- 

 osition would apply to all creeds and all forms 

 of morality. 



As to the Duke of Argyll's statement that 

 " the question is very abstract and ill-defined," 

 I should admit its justice if the title of the paper 

 were taken as the statement of a question. But 

 this is not the case. The proposition which I 

 put forward, in the hope that it would be dis- 

 cussed, is no doubt general in its terms, but it 

 seemed, and still seems to me, definite enough to 

 be discussed. As to the "ambiguity" of which 

 Dr. Ward complains, I cannot see how my propo- 

 sition can have more meanings than one. 



The papers which have been written subse- 

 quently to my paper raise a great variety of 

 points which I feel much tempted to discuss, but 

 I hardly feel at liberty to do so, as they do not 

 in any way qualify anything said by me. Each 

 paper, indeed, is an illustration of the truth of 

 some part of my proposition or of the assertions 

 by which it is introduced ; for each shows in 

 various ways how very close is the connection 

 in the writer's mind between the theological sys- 

 tem which he believes to be true and the moral 

 system which he considers to be good ; and this, 

 again, shows that the question of truth must pre- 

 cede the question of goodness, and cannot be 

 determined by any answer which may be given 

 to the latter question. I cannot help thinking that 

 if this were understood generally it would affect 

 very deeply the character of a great proportion 

 of current theological speculation. — Nineteenth 

 Century. 



RICHARD WAGXER. 



By H. K. HAWEIS. 



WAGNER is the most powerful personality 

 that has appeared in the world of music 

 since Beethoven. But indeed he seems to me, in 

 his wide range as poet, dramatist, musician, and 

 philosopher, almost alone in the history of Art. 



Beethoven was a musician only. His glory is 

 to have carried the art of music to its extreme 

 limits of development : no one has yet gone be- 

 yond him. 



Wagner says, " I have invented nothing." 

 You cannot invent metre after the Greeks, or the 

 modern drama after Shakespeare, or coloring and 

 perspective after the Italians — there is a point at 



which an art ceases to grow and stands full-blown 

 like a flower. 



Most people admit that in music, as in other 

 arts, that point has been reached. What, then, 

 remained ? This, according to Richard Wagner : 

 to concentrate into one dazzling focus all the arts, 

 .and, having sounded and developed the expres- 

 sional depth, and determined the peculiar function 

 of each, to combine them at length into one per- 

 fect and indivisible whole. 



Words seem childishly inadequate to render 

 all at once such a conception as this. Slowly we 

 may master some of its details and allow them to 

 orb into a perfect whole. If you stand at the 

 foot of one of the Alps, you can see but a little 



