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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



formances than of the object of their praise, it is 

 the commonest candor to admit that this con- 

 ception of immortality owes its origin entirely to 

 men who were thinking of a life absorbed in the 

 interior contemplation of a God full of all perfec- 

 tions — a contemplation breaking out into thanks- 

 giving only in the intensity of their love and 

 adoration. Whatever else this conception of im- 

 mortality may be, the very last phrase which can 

 be justly applied to it is " gross " or " selfish." 

 I fear that the positivists have left the Christian 

 objects of their criticism so far behind that they 

 have ceased- not merely to realize what Christians 

 mean, but have sincerely and completely forgot- 

 ten that Christians ever had a meaning at all. 

 That positivists should regard any belief in the 

 "beatific vision " as a wild piece of fanaticism, I 

 can understand, but that, entering into the mean- 

 ing of that fanaticism, they should describe the 

 desire for it as a gross piece of selfishness, I can- 

 not understand ; and I think it more reasonable, 

 therefore, to assume that they have simply lost 

 the key to the language of adoration. More- 

 over, when I come to note Mr. Harrison's own 

 conception of the future life, it appears to me 

 that it differs only from the Christian's concep- 

 tion by its infinite deficiencies, and in no respect 

 by superior moral qualities of any kind. That 

 conception is, in a word, posthumous energy. 

 He holds that if we could get rid of the vulgar 

 notion of a survival of personal sensations and of 

 growing mental and moral faculties after death, 

 we should consecrate the notion of posthumous 

 activity, and anticipate with delight our " coming 

 incorporation with the glorious future of our 

 race," 1 as we cannot possibly consecrate those 

 great hopes now. 



But, in the first place, what is this " glorious 

 future of our race " which I am invited to contem- 

 plate ? It is the life in a better organized society 

 of a vast number of these merely temporary 

 creatures whose personal sensations, if they ever 

 could be " perpetuated," Mr. Harrison regards 

 as giving us the best conception of a " true hell." 

 Now, if an improved and better organized future 

 of ephemerals be so glorious to anticipate, what 

 elements of glory are there in it which would not 

 belong to the immortality looked forward to by 

 the Christian — a far more improved future of end- 

 lessly growing natures ? Is it the mere fact that 

 ' I shall myself belong to the one future which ren- 

 ders it unworthy, while the absence of any " per- 

 petuity " of my personal " sensations " from the 

 other renders it unselfish ? I always supposed 

 i P. 313. 



selfishness to consist, not in the desire for any 

 noble kind of life in which I might share, but in 

 the preference for my own happiness at the ex- 

 pense of some one else's. If it is selfish to desire 

 the perpetuation of a growing life, which not only 

 does not, as far as I know, interfere with the 

 volume of moral growth in others, but certainly 

 contributes to it, then it must be the true unself- 

 ishness to commit suicide at once, supposing sui- 

 cide to be therms to personal "sensation." But 

 then universal suicide would be inconsistent with 

 the glorious future of our race, so I suppose it 

 must at least be postponed till our own sensations 

 have been so far " perpetuated " as to leave heirs 

 behind them. If Condorcet is to be held up to 

 our admiration for anticipating on the edge of the 

 grave his " coming incorporation with the glori- 

 ous future of his race," i. e., with ourselves and 

 our posterity, may we not infer that there is 

 something in ourselves, i. e., in human society as 

 it now exists, which is worthy of his vision — 

 something in which we need not think it " selfish " 

 to participate, even though our personal " sensa- 

 tions " do form a part of it ? Where, then, does 

 the selfishness of desiring to share in a glorious 

 future even through personal " sensations " be- 

 gin ? The only reasonable or even intelligible an- 

 swer, as far as I can see, is this : as soon as that 

 personal " sensation " for ourselves excludes a 

 larger and wider growth for others, but no soon- 

 er. But then no Christian ever supposed for a 

 moment that his personal immortality could or 

 would interfere with any other being's growth. 

 And if so, where is the selfishness ? What a 

 Christian desires is a higher, truer, deeper union 

 with God for all, himself included. If his own 

 life drop out of that future, he supposes that 

 there will be so much less that really does glorify 

 the true righteousness, and no compensating 

 equivalent. If it be Mr. Harrison's mission to 

 disclose to us that any perpetuity of sensation on 

 our own parts will positively exclude something 

 much higher which would exist if we consented to 

 disappear, he may, I think, prove his case. But 

 in the absence of any attempt to do so, his concep- 

 tion that it is noble and unselfish to be more than 

 content — grateful — for ceasing to live any but a 

 posthumous life seems to me simply irrational. 



But, further, the equivalent which Mr. Harrison 

 offers me for becoming, as I had hoped to become> 

 in another world, an altogether better member of 

 a better society, does not seem to me more than 

 a very doubtful good. My posthumous activity 

 will be of all kinds, some of which I am glad to 

 anticipate, most of which I am very sorry to an- 



