THE POLICY OF AGGRANDIZEMENT. 



551 



The propagation of Christianity will hardly be 

 alleged as the object of British conquest in India 

 or anywhere else, especially as the governing class 

 of the imperial nation is itself rapidly tending in 

 a very different direction. "Whatever else Chris- 

 tianity may be, it is not a religion of conquest. 

 Its founders, and that later body of apostles who 

 evangelized and civilized the northern tribes, pre- 

 sented themselves at all events as purely spiritual 

 agencies, wholly unconnected with military power 

 or with blowing rebels away from guns. A mem- 

 ber of the Society for the Propagation of the Gos- 

 pel would, perhaps, be shocked by the suggestion 

 that whatever is best and most spiritual in the 

 nature of a Hindoo would be likely to restrain 

 him from abandoning the religion of his fathers 

 to embrace the religion of the conqueror. If the 

 number of converts made by the Church of Eng- 

 land in India, backed as she is by power and 

 wealth, were compared with the number made by 

 Xavier, taking the latter at the lowest possible 

 estimate, the result would be by no means flatter- 

 ing to political religion. Nor, if the testimony of 

 the shrewdest observers may be trusted, are the 

 converts of Xavier likely to have been less re- 

 spectable or less sincere than those made by the 

 Church of England. 



The political dominion of India is a legacy 

 from generations, the political aims, the commer- 

 cial policy, the public morality, and the general 

 conditions of which were different from ours. 

 Whether, if it were offered to us now for the first 

 time, we should do wisely in accepting it — whether 

 it would not be better to secure free commercial 

 access without political dominion — may be rea- 

 sonably doubted. In fact, even the generations 

 by which the empire was founded were drawn on 

 for the most part, not only without design, but 

 against their wishes, and were always trying to 

 set a limit to the progress of cenquest, though 

 they could never succeed in doing so. 1 But, by 

 a course of events which there is little use in dis- 

 cussing, as it cannot now be reversed, India has 

 become ours ; and nobody would now propose 

 that we should either give it up or let it be taken 

 from us. Independently of imperial pride, we 

 are bound to maintain our hold on it by strong 

 bonds both of duty and of interest. Our depart- 

 ure, after suppressing the native governments 

 and destroying the organizing forces, would con- 

 sign the country to a sanguinary anarchy,- and 

 place in jeopardy British property and invest- 



1 See the preface to Mr. Sidney Owen's " Selection from 

 Marquis Wellcsley's Dispatches," and the dispatches them- 

 selves. 



ments, the aggregate value of which can hardly 

 be less than four hundred millions. Still, of the 

 two objects, India and England, the most spirited 

 advocate of aggrandizement must allow that Eng- 

 land is to be preferred, and therefore that there 

 is a limit to the perils to be incurred, and the 

 sacrifices to be made, for the sake of India. Some 

 things have been mentioned which seem to show 

 that this limit is not entirely beyond the horizon, 

 and even that, unless Indian finances assume a 

 more hopeful aspect, it may come very distinctly 

 into view. 



There are two ways of keeping our hold on 

 India. One, and no doubt the more certain while 

 it lasts, is to forego internal improvement, and to 

 lavish the earnings of our people in the mainte- 

 nance of armaments large enough to command 

 the Mediterranean, at the same time occupying 

 Egypt and every place else that may be necessary 

 in order literally to annex India to England by an 

 unbroken line of British territories, fortresses, 

 and waters. The other way is to keep on good 

 terms with the Mediterranean nations. What- 

 ever depends on amity must be to some extent 

 precarious. But there is no apparent reason why 

 this amity should be broken. Our possession of 

 India does not hurt or menace the Mediterranean 

 nations in the slightest degree; it benefits them, 

 so long as we keep the Indian ports open to their 

 trade, and it need not give them any sort of um- 

 brage. To do wanton mischief may be in their 

 power, but there is no ground for presuming that 

 they will be inclined to do it, especially as they 

 would obviously hurt themselves. As to the po- 

 tentate, whoever he may be, through whose ter- 

 ritory the Suez Canal runs, he will surely be no 

 more tempted to destroy or close it than a turn- 

 pike man is tempted to nail up his own gate. 



That Russia meditates an invasion of British 

 India is a belief which, if it were not shared by 

 some persons of mark, we should be inclined to 

 call a chimera. Mere proximity does not denote 

 hostile designs ; if it did, there would be no peace 

 on earth. The natural barrier between the two 

 empires is stronger than that between any other 

 two conterminous countries in the world. If 

 Russia, reckoning by mere miles, without regard 

 to obstacles, is near to us, we are equally near to 

 her; and if she has arrived at this position by 

 continual additions of territory, we have done 

 the same. Both empires have grown in the same 

 manner, and one as naturally as the other, by ex- 

 tension in a sort of political vacuum, where noth- 

 ing opposed them but the arms of barbarous or 

 half-civilized powers. In each case, probably, 



