THE SKEPTICISM OF BELIEVERS. 



559 



with a very large class of believers. A legitimate 

 objection to pait with the ancient creed may rest 

 upon philosophical, or moral, or aesthetic grounds. 

 Ultimately, it may be said, the questions are all 

 one. The true, the good, and the beautiful are, 

 we may admit, in some sense identical. The 

 one final question is, therefore, "What is the 

 truth ? " The aesthetic objection to change be- 

 comes contemptible when it admits as a possi- 

 bility that a belief known to be false may still be 

 beautiful. The moral objection becomes at best 

 a respectable prejudice when it implies a reluc- 

 tance to press philosophical doubts to their ulti- 

 mate issue. But, while accepting this most em- 

 phatically, it may be worth while to point out 

 what are the assumptions involved in the moral 

 objection without examining their ultimate valid- 

 ity. It is asserted, in a great variety of forms, 

 that the sense of duty is based upon some kind 

 of belief in theology. Whether embodied in the 

 blunt assertion that men would be murderers, 

 liars, and adulterers, but for hell-fire, or diluted 

 into the more abstract theory that we cannot 

 preserve our loftiest ethical, conceptions without 

 preserving our belief in the divine order of the 

 universe, this doctrine is not merely proclaimed 

 by mere bullies of the pulpit, but is expounded 

 by serious thinkers worthy of all respect, and 

 therefore represents a force with which we clear- 

 ly have to reckon. Let us endeavor to draw out 

 in articulate shape the positions tacitly assumed 

 by its defenders. 



Perhaps the most important task for philoso- 

 phers at the present day is that of placing mo- 

 rality upon a scientific basis. We cannot expect 

 that any moral theory will yet deserve the name 

 of a science. But we may hope to prepare the 

 way. We may confirm principles already estab- 

 lished by empirical methods, show in what direc- 

 tion and in what sense they are capable of mod- 

 ification, and save them from a dangerous asso- 

 ciation with the decaying and inconsistent theories 

 of theological metaphysics. The first condition 

 of success is the rejection of the main contention 

 of the theologian. We must get rid of the whole 

 scheme of thought which asserts, more or less 

 explicitly, the necessity of a supernatural basis 

 for moral beliefs. If morality is to be scientific 

 in method, though not a completely coordinated 

 body of scientific truths, we must find our data 

 within Nature, that is to say, within the sphere 

 accessible to the ordinary methods of investiga- 

 tion. Morality, that is, like political or sanitary 

 sciences, must be placed upon a sound inductive 

 basis, if we admit, as most serious thinkers vir- 



tually admit, that no other basis is trustwor- 

 thy. 



The constructive method follows from this 

 primary assumption. Morality must rest upon 

 the truths which, if fully ascertained, would form 

 the science of "sociology." We can, it is as- 

 sumed, determine with sufficient accuracy what 

 are the laws which regulate the development of 

 the social organism, and what are the conditions 

 imposed upon it by its environment. We can 

 infer what are the individual instincts which con- 

 tribute to its growth and stability; and what, 

 consequently, are the laws, a recognition and 

 acceptance of which would be favorable to its 

 healthy development. Laying them down we 

 should virtually construct the moral code. Fur- 

 ther, we should investigate the process by which 

 the race has gradually felt out certain rules es- 

 sential to its welfare. We should find that they 

 have neither been imposed from without nor de- 

 duced from abstract speculation. The race has 

 discovered that the practice of murder is injurious 

 to its welfare, as it has discovered that intoxica- 

 tion is prejudicial to health — by trying the ex- 

 periment on a large scale. The so-called intui- 

 tions will of course be deprived of their super- 

 natural character, and regarded simply as as- 

 sumptions verified by experience, and now capable 

 of independent proof, though not originally dis- 

 covered by abstract reasoning. They will have 

 the weight due to the experience of ages, and in 

 their main outlines may be taken to be just as 

 much beyond the reach of possible refutation as 

 any of the primary data of observation. They 

 are as certain as any of those simple rules which 

 are confirmed by daily and hourly experience — 

 as certain as the laws that men are mortal, that 

 fire bums, and water drowns ; and such certainty, 

 if it does not satisfy metaphysicians, is enough 

 to regulate practice. We should infer, again, 

 that the development of society is conditioned 

 by, and tends in its turn to stimulate, the growth 

 of those higher instincts which are unintelligible 

 in regard to the isolated unit, but essential ele- 

 ments of the great binding forces of society. We 

 should see how their growth is interwoven with 

 the growth of the intellectual and emotional fac- 

 ulties, and determine the conditions favorable to 

 their strength, and calculated to make them con- 

 tribute to individual as well as to social welfare. 

 We should then be in a position to examine the 

 nature of the most efficient sanctions of morality. 

 How is an observance of the rules essential to 

 the welfare of the race to be enforced upon its 

 individual members ? The unbeliever has to ad- 



