THE SKEPTICISM OF BELIEVERS. 



5G3 



said, is under the disadvantage that he cannot 

 argue effectively with the man who deliberately 

 prefers evil to good. He may prove the sinner's 

 conduct to be injurious to society, but not to be 

 injurious to himself. The believer, and the be- 

 liever alone, can demonstrate vice to be a bad 

 speculation. 



Now, it must be frankly confessed that, if hell 

 existed, and could be proved to exist, men would 

 act differently. If we believed in hell, that is, as 

 we believe in Paris, we should be other than we 

 are, though whether better or worse depends 

 upon further considerations. The undeniable 

 fact that the belief produces so little effect as 

 preachers are always telling us, proves that the 

 argument has some weak point in practice. In- 

 deed, one remark is obvious. Allow me to as- 

 sume the reality of my dreams, and I will produce 

 conclusive argument for any course of conduct 

 whatever; but the assumption is rather a bold 

 one. My argument, you say, would be powerful 

 if its data were sound. That does not show that 

 it is better for practical purposes than one which 

 appeals to less weighty but more real considera- 

 tions. A penny in cash is more satisfactory than 

 a check for millions upon an imaginary bank. 

 Nor, indeed, is the argument in any case so good 

 as it looks. If virtue is a sham, and hell exists, 

 then you can demonstrate that it would have been 

 better for men not to have been born, but you 

 cannot create in them good instincts. They can 

 be coerced, but not changed without a miracle. 

 If, on the contrary, virtue is a reality, it supplies 

 real motives, which may therefore be sufficient 

 without attempting to fabricate infinite motives. 

 If there is such a thing as an altruist impulse, it 

 can, like all other impulses, be set in motion by 

 strictly finite considerations. 



But the force of the argument is destroyed by 

 another remark, which it is convenient to over- 

 look. A law is not effective in proportion simply 

 to the severity of the ruler, but also in proportion 

 to his justice. A tyrant makes obedient slaves, 

 not virtuous subjects. In your anxiety to enforce 

 morality you outrage the conscience. You in- 

 vent a judge who punishes savagely, who punish- 

 es one man for the sins of another, and who pun- 

 ishes frailties for which he is himself responsible. 

 Is it strange that some men refuse to be cowed, 

 and others invent devices for evading your law, 

 as plausible as those by which you would enforce 

 it ? The ordinary common-sense of mankind 

 clings to the conviction expressed by the irrever- 

 ent Omar Khayyam : 



" He's a good fellow, and 'twill all be well." 



Isn't he ? Some believers think so, and infer 

 that God will deal with his creatures by healing 

 their diseases instead of tormenting the sick. A 

 more numerous class has discovered that God, 

 with all his severity, can be propitiated on easy 

 terms. The proper ceremonies or the right state 

 of emotion will induce lain to clear all scores, and 

 write paid at the bottom of the account. Science 

 seems to say that Nature never forgives. What 

 has been has been, and what will be depends 

 upon what is. But Omnipotence can make things 

 be as though they had not been, and therefore a 

 miraculous mercy will check the operations of 

 miraculous vengeance. The worst of using 

 dreams in place of efficient motives is, that 

 dreams are surprisingly pliant to men's wishes. 

 It is doubtful whether the conscience has been 

 more stimulated by its fears of retribution or 

 deadened by visions of pardon. Hell is a power- 

 ful weapon, for some purposes, to those who be- 

 lieve in it, but in practice it tends to provoke 

 either revolt or evasion, as much as to enforce 

 obedience. 



Such considerations may help to explain why 

 it is that the moral standard of the race has been 

 so little affected by theological stimulants. If a 

 theologian could prove that vice involves absurdi- 

 ties so great as to make it impossible, we might 

 be grateful to him. But no one can assert, and the 

 theologian persistently denies, that the unlimited 

 application of this imaginary scourge has really 

 made the race better. Thinking of all the atro- 

 cities perpetrated under the religious regime, of 

 its frequent effect in absolutely deadening the 

 conscience, of the false standards which on any 

 hypothesis it has often substituted for the true 

 one, of the indirect injury done by crushing the 

 intellect or the moral nature from a cowardly 

 fear of possible abuses, one may be almost 

 tempted to doubt whether its effect has been 

 elevating or deteriorating. The truth is, that we 

 are touching upon a problem of extreme com- 

 plexity, which is obscured by all kinds of con- 

 fusion. What, one may ask, is the relation be- 

 tween the creed and the moral standard actually 

 recognized by a race? To approximate to an 

 answer, we should have to distinguish between 

 true and sham beliefs, to make allowance for the 

 tacit repeal of one set of doctrines ostentatiously 

 advanced by another set covertly insinuated, and 

 to estimate the innumerable indirect influences 

 of the creed upon the whole social structure. 

 One consideration, however, will be enough for 

 my present purpose. 



Nobody will deny that men's actions are 



